No fatalities

Near Collision Avoided During Runway 08 Departure (VH-IOA)

Horn Island Airport, Queensland

On October 12, 2016, a Pilatus Britten-Norman Ltd BN2A-20 (registration VH-IOA) was involved in an aviation accident near Horn Island Airport, Queensland. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: These findings should not be read as apportioning blame or liability to any particular organisation or individual. This summary draws on records from the Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB); 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

Sourcesthe Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB)Primary reportUpdated 2026-07-04Data APIEditorial standards

A near collision occurred when an aircraft backtracking runway 08 took off while another was on approach, despite both crews being aware of each other. The crew likely misheard a broadcast and relied on imprecise TCAS range.

Background

Both flight crews of the involved aircraft were aware of the other aircraft's presence and approximate position prior to the near collision event.

Events

While backtracking runway 08, the captain of aircraft ZZJ was conscious that they were occupying the main runway being used by other aircraft in the circuit. A broadcast from aircraft IOA indicated that ZZJ could depart before IOA landed. This broadcast supported the captain's motivation to avoid delaying their departure from runway 08. The captain also relied on an approximate position of IOA from the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) when deciding to take off. However, the TCAS range scale was set to 12 nautical miles (NM); the captain subsequently reported that a 6 NM range scale could have provided a more accurate picture of the relative position of IOA.

During the take-off, the flight crew of ZZJ probably misheard a broadcast from the pilot in IOA that instructed them to hold short of runway 14. As a result, they did not reject the take-off. It was not determined whether this radio broadcast occurred before or after ZZJ reached their decision speed (V1) at which a safe rejected take-off would no longer be possible.

Conclusion

The incident involved two aircraft operating in the same airspace, with one departing from a runway while another was approaching. The captain of the departing aircraft was influenced by the broadcast to depart ahead of the arriving aircraft and relied on TCAS information at a large range scale. A potential miscommunication may have prevented a rejected take-off.