What happened
During a morning shift, the flight crew experienced significant time pressure due to an unexpected increase in workload, which reduced the time available for flight planning. This pressure was noted by the crew prior to the flight. During the start-up sequence of the S-92A, the collective was not lowered at the required time.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the crew's workload and the specific operational requirements of the aircraft. It was noted that the Pilot Monitoring (PM) was performing their first flight in this specific role on the S-92A. This particular aircraft model required the collective to be lowered during start-up, a task the PM had not previously performed in this role. Furthermore, the operator's fleet did not include other helicopters that required this specific start-up action.
While the operator's standard operating procedures mandated that the collective be lowered, the investigation found that there was no requirement for a verbal call-out to verify the position of the lever. The investigation also examined the division of labour, noting that while the crew had discussed responsibilities, the operator's documentation lacked a specific division of tasks between the Pilot Flying (PF) and the PM during start-up.
Findings
- The flight crew faced increasing time pressure due to an unexpected workload.
- The PM's unfamiliarity with the S-92A start-up procedure, specifically regarding the lowering of the collective, contributed to the error.
- The absence of a mandatory call-out in the operator's procedures meant there was no secondary check to verify the collective position.
- The operator's documentation did not explicitly define the division of tasks between the PF and PM during the start-up phase.