What happened
On 31 October 2023, extreme fire weather and dry conditions caused significant fire escalations across the Tenterfield, Inverell, and Glen Innes regions of New South Wales. During the afternoon, 10 active fires were recorded in the Tenterfield area, prompting the deployment of up to 17 NSW Rural Fire Service (RFS) aircraft.
During this period, a state operations controller ordered the dispatch of a birddog aircraft and 3 large air tankers (LATs) to the Tenterability fireground. This dispatch occurred without consulting the local incident management team. Consequently, the 3 large air tankers (LATs) and the birddog arrived in the area without specific targets or updated airspace information. Because the incoming crews were using incorrect frequencies, the arrival of these aircraft caused multiple communication issues within the already crowded airspace. Additionally, the air attack supervisor was required to leave the fireground to refuel just as the heavy tankers arrived, leaving the area without planned aerial supervision.
The investigation
The investigation examined the dispatch processes used by the state air desk and the integration of newly arrived aircraft into existing incident plans. Investigators found that while the state operations controller had the authority to dispatch aircraft, there was no established procedure to ensure such dispatches were coordinated with local incident management teams. This lack of coordination meant that receiving personnel were unaware of the tankers' arrival times or intended targets.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into how communication frequencies were managed. It was discovered that the state air desk was unaware that three separate fire common traffic advisory frequencies (Fire-CTAFs) were in use. Because there was no requirement to visually map these boundaries, the incoming crews were provided with incomplete information regarding the active frequencies in the area.
Findings
- The NSW RFS lacked a procedure to ensure that proactive aircraft dispatches from the state air desk were integrated into local incident plans.
- There was no formal process to ensure that state air desk personnel had accurate, up-to-date knowledge of all active Fire-CTAFs.
- The lack of coordination between the state air desk and the incident management team resulted in aircraft arriving without necessary operational data.
- A lack of established cross-border coordination procedures between the NSW RFS and the Queensland Fire and Emergency Service increased risks to aircraft separation.
- There was no effective mechanism to manage wake turbulence separation for the heavy tankers, increasing the risk of loss of aircraft control.
- Procedures did not sufficiently ensure that aerial supervision would remain adequate when the primary air attack supervisor was forced to depart the scene.