What happened
On the early morning of January 18, 2003, a Singapore Airlines Cargo Boeing 747-412F, registration 9V-SFH, was taxiing at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport for a scheduled freight flight to Dubai. The airport was experiencing heavy fog with visibility dropping below 100 meters in certain areas.
During the taxi via taxiway Romeo, the aircraft's right wing struck the nacelle of a stationary deicing vehicle positioned in the Sierra Echo 1 (SE1) area. The crew did not perceive the impact and continued the taxi to the runway holding point. The aircraft departed at 05:15 UTC. The collision was only discovered later that morning when ground staff noticed damage to the deicing vehicle, and subsequently, when ground agents in Dubai identified debris and structural damage to the aircraft's right wing.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the positioning of the deicing vehicle and the visibility conditions during the night operations. Investigators examined the deicing area (SE1) and found that the documentation regarding vehicle positioning was imprecise and failed to highlight the asymmetry of the area, which could lead a driver to park too close to the taxiway.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into the status of the deicing area, which was in an informal "open" state. This undocumented status meant there were no specific procedures for the pre-positioning of vehicles or for verifying their placement. The investigation also analyzed the crew's perception of the obstacle, noting that the aircraft's flight data recorder showed no perceptible change in direction or flight behavior following the strike.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the incorrect positioning of a deicing vehicle that had been left unattended.
- The deicing operator, who was unfamiliar with this specific site, had positioned the vehicle too close to the aircraft path due to poor visibility and imprecise ground markings.
- The deicing vehicle's nacelle was left in a high position, which contributed to the strike.
- The flight crew misjudged the dimensions of the obstacle; they observed the vehicle's anti-collision light but incorrectly assumed it marked the highest point of the vehicle, leading them to believe there was sufficient clearance.
- There was a lack of formal procedures for verifying the correct placement of deicing equipment once the area was opened for operations.
- Incomplete and imprecise documentation regarding the deicing areas contributed to the error.