What happened
On April 27, 2002, an Airbus A340-313 was performing a training flight from Frankfurt/Main to Dubai. The crew consisted of a training captain and a student pilot, who was performing only his fourth flight as the pilot flying. The aircraft was configured for takeoff using "Configuration 1+F" (Slats 20° / Flaps 18°), a setting that the training captain had previously noted increased the risk of a tailstrike.
During the takeoff roll, the pilot flying applied significant right sidestick input (between 12° and 15°) to counteract a crosswind. This input caused several roll spoilers on the right wing to deploy, increasing drag and reducing lift on that side. As the aircraft reached rotation speed (VR), the pilot continuously pulled the sidestick backward, eventually reaching a full deflection of 16.9°. This aggressive input resulted in a rapid pitch-up rate of approximately 4°/sec, exceeding the recommended rate.
The crew noted a delay in acceleration due to gusty wind conditions. Upon rotation, the crew heard a scraping sound from the rear of the fuselage and reported it to the cockpit, indicating a tailstrike had occurred. To avoid the time-consuming process of fuel dumping, the captain elected to perform an overweight landing. The aircraft landed without further incident, though inspections later revealed significant scraping marks on the underside of the rear fuselage.
The investigation
The BFU analyzed the flight data recorder (FDR) to reconstruct the takeoff sequence. The investigation compared the flight parameters of this event against two previous normal takeoffs. The data revealed that the sidestick input during the incident was significantly higher than the 10° recommended for rotation. Furthermore, the pitch rate during the incident was notably higher than the standard 2.5° to 3°/sec.
The investigation also examined the pilot's training background, noting that the student pilot was transitioning from conventional aircraft (B757/B767) to sidestick-controlled aircraft and had not specifically focused on takeoff rotation techniques during simulator training.
Findings
- The primary cause of the tailstrike was the failure to follow proper takeoff and rotation techniques by the pilot flying during a crosswind takeoff.
- The use of a takeoff configuration that increased tailstrike risk, combined with high-magnitude sidestical inputs, contributed to the event.
- Excessive sidestick deflection (up to 16.9°) and an aggressive pitch rate (up to 4°/sec) caused the aircraft's tail to strike the runway.
- Large sidestick inputs to counteract the crosswind caused the deployment of roll spoilers, which increased drag and further increased the risk of a tailstrike.
- The pilot flying had limited experience with sidestick-controlled aircraft and had not received specialized training in rotation techniques under varying meteorological conditions.