What happened
On December 3, 2003, a Piper PA 42-720 (Cheyenne) was operating a commercial flight from Zurich to Leipzig/Halle. The flight crew, consisting of two pilots, was aware of approaching fog based on pre-flight weather documentation. Upon arrival at Leipzig/Halle, the crew received ATIS information indicating visibility of only 250 meters due to fog.
After performing two missed approaches on runway 26, the crew attempted a third approach, this time targeting runway 28 in hopes of finding better visibility. During this approach, the reported runway visual range (RVR) was between 325 and 400 meters, which was below the required 550 meters for a CAT I approach. The pilot landed approximately halfway down the runway. Due to the heavy fog, the crew failed to identify the taxiway exit (P1) and subsequently overran the end of the runway. While attempting to turn the aircraft around, the right propeller struck an approach light for runway 10, causing damage to the propeller blades and the airfield lighting.
There were no injuries among the seven passengers and two crew members on board.
The investigation
The BFU investigation focused on the decision-making process regarding the approach and the crew's familiarity with operational procedures. The investigation examined the weather conditions, the aircraft's flight path via radar data, and the regulatory requirements for all-weather operations under JAR-OPS 1. The BFU also reviewed the crew's training and their knowledge of the rules governing the continuation of an approach under low-visibility conditions.
Findings
- The crew attempted a landing despite visibility being below the legal minimums for their authorized approach type.
- The crew failed to abort the approach at the outer marker (NDB MA) as required by regulations when visibility was known to be insufficient.
- The crew lacked familiarity with the specific JAR-OPS 1 procedures regarding the commencement and continuation of approaches in low visibility.
- The crew also lacked Crew Resource Management (CRM) training.
- The primary cause of the runway excursion was the inability to identify the taxiway exit due to the extremely poor visibility.
- While the landing point was late on the runway, the BFU determined the remaining runway length was sufficient to stop the aircraft; the overrun was driven by the lack of visual cues for exiting the runway.