Autopilot Disengagement During Departure from Corfu

Incident Overview and Flight Details On August 2, 2003, a Boeing 737-800 (manufacturer serial number 28069, built in 1998) departed from Kerkira (Corfu) Airport in Greece, bound for Düsseldorf. The aircraft, which had a maximum takeoff mass of 78,244 kg and was certified by the German Federal Aviation Office (LBA) on May 7, 1998, carried 179 passengers and 6 crew members. The flight took off from runway 17 at approximately 11:10 local time. The assigned Standard Instrument Departure (SID) TIGRA 1C required the aircraft to climb to 500 feet and then execute a left turn to a heading of 270 degrees. Due to obstacles near the runway, a visual climb was required up to 500 feet, with a recommended speed of 210 knots. The flight was conducted in English with Korfu Ground and Tower. The weather at the time was described by the pilot-in-command as gusty winds, rain, and embedded cumulonimbus clouds, with a 40% probability of thunderstorms and reduced visibility during the morning hours. The aircraft was in radio contact with Korfu Ground on 121.7 MHz and Tower on 120.85 MHz. The airport is situated at approximately 5 feet above sea level and is surrounded by hilly terrain. The Minimum Safe Altitude (MSA) within a 20 NM radius of the GAR VOR is 4,300 feet to the southwest and 7,200 feet to the northeast. The flight data recorder was recovered and analyzed by the BFU in Braunschweig, while the cockpit voice recorder was unavailable for analysis due to its 30-minute recording duration. The flight data recorder analysis indicated that the aircraft began to roll left shortly after takeoff, reaching a bank angle of 37 degrees before the autopilot disengaged. The pilot-in-command manually corrected the bank angle, and the autopilot was subsequently re-engaged. The aircraft then continued its flight to Düsseldorf without further incident. The investigation concluded that the incident was caused by the activation of the autopilot while the aircraft was already in a 34-degree bank, combined with the aircraft's inertia. No technical fault in the auto-flight system was found. The crew's failure to recognize the situation was possibly due to high workload after takeoff and deficiencies in Cockpit Resource Management (CRM) and Crew Coordination Concept (CCC). External factors, such as thunderstorms and turbulence, may have also affected the crew's attention distribution. The BFU did not issue a safety recommendation, as the operator had already conducted a review of the incident with the crew and ordered additional simulator training for immediate turns after takeoff.