What happened
On April 23, 2005, a Boeing 737-800 operated by a Turkish airline arrived at Stuttgart Airport from Hurghada, Egypt, originally scheduled to continue to Düsseldorf. During the stop, 100 passengers disembarked, but 89 passengers remained on board, specifically seated in the rear sections (rows 18-32). Additionally, approximately 1,860 kg of baggage remained in the rear cargo hold (compartment three).
As the aircraft prepared for its onward flight, a new load and trim sheet was generated. A loading group supervisor noticed the aircraft appeared unusually tail-heavy and requested a re-verification of the loading instructions. Although the ramp agent received confirmation from ground operations that the load was correct, the imbalance persisted. During taxiing, the supervisor observed the nose wheels drifting outward during turns, indicating a lack of ground contact due to the weight distribution. He alerted the duty traffic controller, but because the controller could not see the aircraft from his position, he assumed the flight had already departed.
Upon receiving takeoff clearance for runway 25, the aircraft began its takeoff roll. Shortly after acceleration, the aircraft tipped backward onto its tail. The pilot immediately aborted the takeoff, and the aircraft came to a stop on taxiway E. The incident resulted in one person slightly injured and heavy damage to the aircraft structure.
The investigation
The BFU examined the flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and the aircraft's load sheets. The investigation focused on the discrepancy between the calculated load sheet and the actual distribution of passengers and cargo. Investigators also reviewed the communication capabilities between the duty traffic controller and ground personnel, as well as the visibility of the airport operational areas from the control office.
Findings
- The primary cause of the tailstrike was an extreme aft center of gravity caused by the concentration of remaining passengers and heavy baggage in the rear of the aircraft.
- While the load sheet indicated a valid center of gravity, the actual physical distribution of the 89 remaining passengers and the 1,860 kg of cargo placed the weight far outside safe limits.
- The flight crew failed to recognize the hazardous weight imbalance, despite the flight attendant noting the unusual seating arrangement and the loading supervisor's explicit warnings regarding the aircraft's physical attitude.
- Communication failures prevented timely intervention; the duty traffic controller lacked a direct radio link to ground/ramp control to stop the aircraft, and limited visibility prevented him from observing the aircraft's unstable taxiing behavior.
Safety action
- The BFU recommended that the German Federal Aviation Office (LBA) increase inspections of aircraft loading practices for Turkish airlines.
- The Turkish aviation authority was advised to review crew operational knowledge regarding aircraft loading and situational awareness.
- Recommendations were made to Stuttgart Airport to establish direct radio communication between the duty traffic controller and ground/ramp control and to improve the visibility of operational areas from the control center.