What happened
On March 27, 1999, at Helsinki-Vantaa Airport, a Finnair ATR 72-201, registration OH-KRE, was cleared for takeoff from runway 22 at intersection Yankee. During the takeoff roll, the flight crew observed a light ahead of them. As the aircraft accelerated toward rotation speed (approximately 118 knots), the pilots identified the source of the light as a Ford Transit vehicle, identified as Viesti 5, which was traveling in the same direction as the aircraft in the middle of the runway.
The aircraft was traveling at a speed of approximately 80–90 knots when the light was first noticed. By the time the crew reached rotation speed, the distance to the vehicle was just under one kilometer. The crew determined that a collision was not imminent and continued the takeoff. Shortly after liftoff, the aircraft passed over the vehicle at an altitude of approximately 50 meters as the vehicle was exiting the runway. The crew subsequently notified air traffic control of the presence of the vehicle on the runway.
The investigation
The investigation examined the actions of the ground vehicle, the aircraft crew, and the air traffic controller. Investigators reviewed radio communications and analyzed the visibility conditions at the time of the incident. It was noted that while visibility was generally good (CAVOK), there was some haze near the runway surface due to evaporation, and sunlight reflecting off nearby snowbanks may have affected visibility.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into the controller's workstation, finding that a structural pillar created a small blind spot (approximately 3 degrees) that obscured the view of the southern edge of the runway from the controller's position. The investigation also reviewed the use of the runway designator and the placement of magnetic markers used to track ground vehicles.
Findings
- The air traffic controller failed to verify that the runway was clear before issuing the takeoff clearance.
- The controller's ability to monitor the runway was hindered by a structural pillar creating a visual blind spot.
- The controller had recently returned to the shift after a seven-week break, which likely reduced their operational routine.
- The controller did not use the ground movement radar to verify the runway status, partly because they had not received training on that specific radar system.
- The ground vehicle was operating according to its instructions and had received clearance to cross runway 15, but the controller did not sufficiently ensure the runway was vacated before the aircraft's departure.