Flight Preparation
The operating company was under a Royal Mail contract to deliver mail from Aberdeen to Shetland Islands daily. The crew had flown LN-PBB from Stauning Airport, Denmark, to Aberdeen on 5 September 1999, arriving at 1700 hrs, to begin a two-week duty period delivering mail. The next morning, 6 September, the crew arrived at 0540 hrs and completed normal checks. Mail was escorted by company ground crew, sorted, and loaded under the commander's supervision; the total weight was confirmed by Royal Mail as 1,196 kg. The commander was satisfied the load was secure and correctly distributed. He checked the weather and knew conditions at Sumburgh Airport were 'poor' but expected to improve, and that Kirkwall Airport had clear weather as a diversion option. The aircraft was serviceable during start, taxi, and takeoff from Aberdeen at 0640 hrs; the commander was the handling pilot.
Diversion to Kirkwall
Cruise was at Flight Level 90. About halfway to Sumburgh, ATC advised that the latest weather at Sumburgh would prevent landing. However, a preceding aircraft was heading to the same destination, so the commander continued toward Sumburgh. When the preceding crew declared a diversion to Aberdeen, the commander decided to divert to Kirkwall. The diversion was uneventful, and the aircraft landed at 0807 hrs. At Kirkwall, the crew uplifted fuel to match the departure quantity (1,200 lb) and waited for weather improvement at Sumburgh.
Attempted Landing at Sumburgh
At approximately 0930 hrs, Kirkwall ATC advised that weather at Sumburgh had improved. The crew prepared for departure, and takeoff was at 0950 hrs with the co-pilot as handling pilot. Cruise was at FL 70 uneventfully. Sumburgh was using Runway 27, the only runway with full ILS. ATIS at 1020 hrs reported: surface wind 340°/07 kt, 9,000 meters visibility in rain, few clouds at 300 ft, scattered at 1,000 ft, broken at 1,600 ft, temperature 12°C, dew point 12°C, tempo cloud broken 1,500 ft with wet runway. Following ATC instructions, the crew descended to 2,000 ft amsl and were instructed to intercept the ILS from a heading of 300°. Once established, the commander noted the co-pilot had difficulty maintaining both localizer and glide slope. The co-pilot was unsure of the cloud break height; the commander estimated 500 ft agl. The co-pilot thought they were slightly high and fast; the commander estimated airspeed at 140 kt as they became visual with the runway. During final approach, the controller gave three wind reports: 010°/11 kt, 010°/11 kt, and 010°/10 kt (two-minute mean surface winds).
Overrun
As the aircraft crossed the runway threshold, the co-pilot called out that he had too much speed and "it wasn't going to work." The commander did not reply; the co-pilot took this as contentment. The commander was concentrating on the runway aspect and heard a comment but did not respond. Touchdown was approximately halfway down the runway. The co-pilot recalled the aircraft bouncing before a second touchdown; neither pilot recalled the touchdown speed. Both pilots applied full foot braking with little apparent effect. As the aircraft neared the runway end, the commander took control and applied full power because he was aware of concrete blocks off the runway end serving as a sea defense and wished to clear them. The aircraft, yawed slightly left and left of the runway centerline, left the runway surface, traveled across grass and a public road, and came to rest on the concrete blocks.
Probable Cause
The official findings state: "The aircraft overran the end of Runway 27 at Sumburgh following a touchdown which was too fast and well down the runway. There was insufficient runway remaining for the aircraft to stop. The landing resulted from a poor approach and no apparent co-operation between the crew. A positive decision from the co-pilot, or better monitoring and an active input from the commander, should have resulted in a go-around and a further approach or a diversion." The report also noted that while this crew may be unusual, it would be appropriate for the operating company to review procedures to ensure safe operations. Additionally, the investigation reviewed flight rules and noted doubts about whether the flight could be completed within company manual limitations given the weather, and that Article 32A of the UK ANO was unclear and should be reviewed by the CAA.