What happened
On July 13, 2016, at 08:28 local time, an Airbus A330-243, registration N279AV, was performing a scheduled international flight from Bogotá, Colombia, to Miami, USA. During the takeoff roll on runway 13L at El Dorado International Airport, the aircraft's left main landing gear struck a runway edge light located at the 31R threshold displacement marker.
The incident occurred during the rotation phase of the takeoff. At the time, a NOTAM was in effect for the airport, indicating that runway 13L/31R had a displaced threshold due to ongoing construction works. This restriction reduced the available runway length for takeoff from the standard 3,950 meters to only 2,700 meters. Because the crew utilized higher rotation speeds based on the full runway length, the aircraft's takeoff roll was extended, leading to the collision with the lighting fixture. Despite the impact, there were no injuries to the 264 occupants on board, and the aircraft continued to Miami, where it landed without further incident.
The investigation
The GRIAA investigation focused on the flight crew's performance and the accuracy of the data entered into the Flight Management Guidance System (FMGS). The investigation established that while the flight dispatch office had provided correct takeoff calculations based on the 2,700-meter restriction, the crew applied "last-minute changes" to the takeoff performance data without considering the active NOTAM or the current meteorological variations.
Investigators found that the first officer, who had been away from line operations for more than 60 days, was responsible for entering the updated data. The investigation also noted that the crew failed to follow the Flight Crew Training Manual (FCTM) requirements, which mandate that all data entered into the aircraft systems must be monitored and confirmed by both pilots. Furthermore, the investigation identified a poor distribution of workload, as the responsibility for incorporating and verifying the flight calculations was left to a single crew member.
Findings
- The primary cause was a lack of situational awareness by the crew, as they failed to account for the reduced runway length specified in the active NOTAM when updating the FMGS.
- The crew did not comply with standard operating procedures regarding the dual verification of flight data entry.
- There was an improper distribution of workload, leaving the verification of takeoff performance data to only one pilot.
- The first officer demonstrated a loss of operational proficiency due to a 60-day absence from regular flight line operations.
- The takeoff speeds were incorrectly calculated, leading to a late rotation that caused the landing gear to strike the runway light.