What happened
On October 16, 2022, at approximately 11:00 local time, a Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet, registration HK5342G, was performing a private flight from Santa Marta to Bogotá. During the takeoff roll at Simón Bolívar International Airport, the pilot heard an unidentified noise and elected to abort the maneuver.
The aircraft failed to stop within the runway limits, exiting the pavement and crossing the safety area and the airport's perimeter fence. The jet proceeded across a public road and ultimately struck a tree near a boardwalk area, where an informal vending stall was located. The impact of the aircraft and resulting debris struck four bystanders. Tragically, a 3-year-old child died from the impact, while three other individuals—a 6-year-old girl, an adult man, and an adult woman—sustained various injuries including head trauma and fractures.
The seven occupants of the aircraft, consisting of two crew members and five passengers, evacuated the plane on their own and were uninjured.
The investigation
The GRIAA investigation focused on the mechanical integrity of the aircraft, the performance of the braking systems, and the crew's decision-making process. Technical inspections of the engine, the braking system, and the engine control unit (ECU) were conducted by the investigators alongside manufacturers from Cirrus, Williams International, and Beringer.
Investigators also analyzed the takeoff performance, including weight and balance, runway length, and rotation speeds. The investigation examined the crew's use of cockpit resources and their specific actions following the decision to abort the takeoff.
Findings
- The investigation determined that all aircraft systems, including the engine and brakes, were functioning correctly during the takeoff and the aborted maneuver.
- The origin of the noise that prompted the abort could not be determined, though it was likely caused by an object shifting within the cargo compartment.
- The primary cause of the accident was a runway excursion resulting from an unnecessary aborted takeoff at high speed on a runway of limited length.
- The crew lacked clear, pre-established criteria for aborting a takeoff, which should have been defined during the pre-flight briefing.
- During the abort sequence, the crew exhibited erratic behavior by re-applying thrust for approximately three seconds, which increased the required stopping distance.
- There was a lack of situational awareness and poor Crew Resource Management (CRM), as the crew failed to recognize that the engine was operating normally and no immediate risk necessitated an abort.
- A lack of defined roles contributed to confusion, as the pilot in command was seated in the right-hand seat (acting as a co-pilot) while the co-pilot was in the left-hand seat.