Incident Overview
On 1 January 2006 at 1915 UTC, an Embraer 135 aircraft, registration LX-LGK, was involved in a ground collision at London City Airport during departure preparations. The aircraft, powered by two Rolls-Royce AE3007 A3 turbofan engines, was operating a public transport passenger flight with 4 crew and 29 passengers on board. No injuries were reported among crew or passengers. The damage consisted of two small punctures in the aircraft skin.
Sequence of Events
After parking on stand and inserting chocks, the flight crew noticed that the brake temperatures were close to the amber range, indicating hot brakes. To facilitate cooling during the turnaround, the parking brake was selected OFF. A Ground Power Unit (GPU) and its tractor were positioned approximately one metre in front of the aircraft. The weather was windy with rain and it was dark.
When departure time approached, the flight crew completed the appropriate checks in preparation for engine start but did not select the parking brake ON. The commander later attributed this omission to human error. This oversight was not identified by either pilot during the before-start checklist.
A single member of the ground crew arrived to assist in the aircraft's departure. Communication between the flight crew and ground crew was to be by hand signals; no headset was provided. The engines were started and the commander signalled to the ground crew that the chocks should be removed. The ground crew removed the chocks from behind the wheels without difficulty but had to strike the chocks in front of the wheels with another chock to displace them.
With the chocks removed, the aircraft began to move forward slowly. It collided with the GPU and its tractor, damaging the aircraft skin in two places. Recognising that a collision had taken place, the commander stopped the aircraft and applied the parking brake. The commander reported that the dark and rainy conditions had prevented him from realising that movement had taken place until the collision occurred, and that in the absence of headset communication, the ground crew was unable to instruct the commander to apply the brakes.
Operator's Perspective
The operator believes that this incident would not have occurred if procedures had required the ground crew to use headset communication (or required two ground crew where hand signals were used), or if ground crew were required to obtain confirmation that the parking brake was set prior to engine start, or if the tractor and GPU had not been parked close in front of the aircraft. The operator is in discussion with the ground handling service provider on these matters.