4 fatalities

Accident Involving HZ-IBN at Blackbushe Aerodrome

Blackbushe, United KingdomLanding (descent or approach)

On July 31, 2015, an Embraer EMB-505 Phenom 300 (registration HZ-IBN) operated by Salem Aviation (Saudi Arabia) was involved in an aviation accident near Blackbushe, United Kingdom during landing or approach. 4 people were killed. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The pilot was appropriately licensed and experienced, with 15 prior operations into Blackbushe, and was reported physically and mentally well. The aircraft was certified for single-pilot operations, and no pre-existing technical defect was found. This summary draws on records from the Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A).

Sourcesthe Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Archives (B3A)Primary reportUpdated 2026-06-11Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered HZ-IBN
Aircraft registered HZ-IBN. Photo: Aeroprints.com / CC BY-SA 3.0, via Wikimedia Commons

On return to Blackbushe, HZ-IBN overtook a microlight during circuit, received TCAS alerts, descended steeply, landed long, overran runway, struck objects, and caught fire. All four occupants survived impact but died from fire.

Flight History

The aircraft HZ-IBN had flown from Blackbushe to Milan earlier in the day, piloted by the same pilot, and was returning with the pilot and three passengers. After descending through the London Terminal Manoeuvring Area (TMA), the flight was handed from London Control to Farnborough Approach. The pilot reported the airfield in sight and was instructed to descend at his own discretion. When approximately four miles south of Blackbushe, he was told to contact Blackbushe Information. The weather was fine with light and variable winds, visibility above ten kilometers, and no low cloud.

Circuit and Conflict

HZ-IBN entered a left-hand circuit for Runway 25 via the crosswind leg. Near the end of the downwind leg, it overtook an Ikarus C42 microlight aircraft, climbing to pass ahead and above it. During the climb at about 1,000 ft above aerodrome level, the aircraft's TCAS generated a "descend" resolution advisory (RA) to resolve a conflict with the microlight. The RA later changed to "maintain vertical speed" and then "adjust vertical speed," possibly to resolve a second conflict with a light aircraft above and east of the aerodrome. Neither the microlight nor the light aircraft had TCAS.

Approach and Landing

Following the climb, HZ-IBN flew a curving base leg, descending at up to 3,000 feet per minute toward the Runway 25 threshold. The TCAS annunciated "clear of conflict" when the aircraft was 1.1 nm from the threshold, at 1,200 ft aal, at 146 KIAS, with landing gear down and flap 3 selected. The aircraft continued the approach at about 150 KIAS. Between 1,200 and 500 ft aal, the average descent rate was approximately 3,000 fpm; at 500 ft the rate was 2,500 fpm. The TAWS generated six "pull up" warnings on final approach. The aircraft crossed the threshold at about 50 ft aal at 151 KIAS. The manufacturer's calculated target threshold speed for the aircraft's mass and configuration was 108 KIAS.

Runway Excursion

The AFISO initiated a full emergency at touchdown because it was clear the aircraft would not stop. Tyre marks indicated the aircraft touched down 710 m beyond the Runway 25 threshold. The Landing Distance Available (LDA) was 1,059 m, so the aircraft touched down 349 m before the end of the declared LDA, and the paved surface extended 89 m beyond that. The aircraft continued along the runway, decelerating, but departed the paved end at a groundspeed of 83 kt (84 KIAS). It struck an earth bank, becoming airborne again, then struck cars in a car park of a commercial site adjacent to the aerodrome. The wing separated, and the fuselage rolled left through 350°, coming to rest on top of the detached wing, heading 064°(M), 30° right side down, approximately level in pitch.

Fire and Rescue

A fire broke out in the underside of the aft fuselage and burned with increasing intensity. The aerodrome's Rescue and Fire Fighting Service (RFFS) responded but found their path blocked by a locked gate between the aerodrome and the commercial site. The first two vehicles arrived at the gate 1 minute 34 seconds after the aircraft left the runway. The third vehicle, carrying a key, arrived about one minute later, and all three passed through the gate 2 minutes 46 seconds after the aircraft left the runway. Because the accident site was in a car park area surrounded by a 2.4 m tall wire mesh fence, the RFFS vehicles drove about 400 m to gain access. Despite applying all available media, they could not control the fire, and its intensity prevented approach to save life. All four occupants survived the impact but subsequently died from the effects of fire. Local authority fire appliances arrived later and extinguished the fire.

Probable cause

The pilot was appropriately licensed and experienced, with 15 prior operations into Blackbushe, and was reported physically and mentally well. The aircraft was certified for single-pilot operations, and no pre-existing technical defect was found. Weather was suitable. HZ-IBN joined the circuit at a speed and height consistent with an intent to extend downwind for the microlight to land first. Subsequent maneuvering across the microlight's path triggered TCAS warnings. After these maneuvers, the aircraft arrived on final approach significantly above the normal profile but configured for landing. During the steep descent, the pilot selected speed brakes, but they remained stowed because they are inhibited with flaps deployed. The aircraft crossed the threshold 43 KIAS above the target speed, leading to a touchdown 710 m beyond the threshold. From touchdown at 134 KIAS, it was impossible to stop within the remaining runway. Brakes were applied almost immediately, and deceleration slightly exceeded the manufacturer's model. The aircraft departed the runway at 83 kt groundspeed, collided with an earth bank and cars, causing wing separation and fire. The occupants survived the impacts but died from fire. Toward the end of the flight, a combination of factors created a very high workload for the pilot, potentially saturating his mental capacity, impeding his ability to take in new information and adapt situational awareness, possibly leading to fixation on continuing the approach to a short runway.