What happened
On April 1, 2010, a Cessna 152, registration CS-AYK, operated by Nortávia, departed from Vilar da Luz for a training flight. The flight plan included a series of touch-and-go maneuvers at Ponte de Sor Aerodrome. Upon arrival at Ponte de Sor, the pilot was unable to establish radio contact with the aerodrome and proceeded using standard procedures for an aerodrome without communications.
While observing the windsock, the pilot opted to use runway 02. Although the pilot noticed white "X" markings at the runway threshold indicating the aerodrome was closed, they proceeded with the intended maneuvers. The pilot interpreted the markings as only prohibiting use of the area before the threshold, assuming a displaced threshold existed. After the first touch-and-go, the pilot was notified via the aerodrome frequency that the facility was closed to all traffic except for specific operations. The crew subsequently diverted to Torres Vedras to land and refuel.
The investigation
The GPIAAF investigation examined the flight preparation, the visibility of runway markings, and the aeronautical information services available at the time. The investigation found that the crew had consulted the Eurocontrol European AIS Database for a pre-flight briefing; however, because Ponte de Sor is a domestic aerodrome, the relevant NOTAMs (classified as Series C and D) were not included in the international briefing.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into the physical state of the runway markings. While markings were placed in accordance with ICAO Annex 14, the investigation noted that the use of plastic strips instead of paint could lead to deformation or displacement. The pilot also reported that a marking intended for the middle of the runway was not visible during the operation.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the inadequacy of the operator's NOTAM retrieval system, which failed to capture relevant information regarding domestic aerodromes.
- The pilot incorrectly interpreted the runway closure markings, believing the usable runway area began after the threshold markings.
- The runway closure markings were made of materials susceptible to wind and environmental factors, which could impair their visibility or position.
- The aerodrome's radio frequency was not active upon the aircraft's arrival, preventing the pilot from establishing contact before the maneuver.
- The flight information service (FIS) was not required to verify NOTAMs for this VFR flight, and the flight plan filed with the Porto ARO did not trigger any alerts regarding the closure.