What happened
On August 17, 2008, a Cessna C 208 B, registration F-OIJO, operated by Tropic Airlines, was preparing for a scheduled passenger flight from Saint Barthélemy to Saint Martin Juliana. During the takeoff roll on runway 10, the pilot observed a person crossing the runway from right to left and momentarily delayed the departure. Once the takeoff area appeared clear, the pilot proceeded with the takeoff.
The aircraft rotated between 75 and 80 knots. Shortly after liftoff, the pilot noticed a shadow on the left side of the aircraft accompanied by a dull thud. Although the pilot reported the sensation of hitting something to the Aerodrome Flight Information Service (AFIS), no visible damage was found during a subsequent inspection at the destination. However, it was later determined that the aircraft had struck a person located on the beach area adjacent to the runway.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the takeoff performance and the safety of the cleared runway extension (prolongement dégagé). Investigators examined the aircraft's weight and balance, noting that the takeoff mass was within legal limits. The investigation also reviewed the pilot's technique, specifically a common practice among local crews of using an intermediate pitch attitude to accelerate more quickly after rotation.
Furthermore, the BEA examined the regulatory environment of the Saint Barthélemy aerodrome. While the civil aviation authorities had authorized the use of a cleared runway extension over the sea for takeoff calculations, the investigation highlighted the difficulty for a pilot to verify that this area was free of obstacles during the high-workload takeoff phase. The investigation also noted that the AFIS officer's position prevented them from monitoring the beach area for pedestrians.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the failure of a pedestrian to comply with the prohibition against stationary presence within the cleared runway extension.
- The pilot's use of a specific takeoff technique, while common in the region, increased the takeoff distance and did not guarantee the clearance of unforeseen obstacles.
- The rotation speed used by the pilot was higher than the 63 knots recommended in the company's operating manual, which further extended the takeoff roll.
- Existing signage and markings on the beach and water were insufficient to guarantee the absence of people or vehicles in the takeoff zone.
Safety action
- The BEA recommended that the DGAC implement equipment or measures to ensure the absence of obstacles during aircraft takeoffs.