What happened
On 13 April 2013, an Airbus A330, registration CS-TOF, operated by TAP Linhas Aéreas, was taxiing toward the parking area at Brasília International Airport (SBBR) following a flight from Lisbon. The aircraft was instructed by Ground Control to proceed via taxiways K, M, R, and L4.
Upon entering taxiway L4, the aircraft's left wing tip collided with a floodlight tower located at Apron 1. The impact caused serious structural damage to the left wing tip of the A330 and moderate damage to the tower. There were no injuries among the 11 crew members or the 239 passengers on board.
The investigation
CENIPA's investigation focused on the operational environment at Brasília Airport, which was undergoing significant construction to expand its parking area. Investigators examined the coordination between the aerodrome operator, ANAC, and the Air Traffic Control Unit.
The investigation reviewed various navigational aids and documents, including NOTAMs, ATIS broadcasts, and several different versions of Aerodrome Charts (including Jeppesen and DECEA charts). The investigation also looked into the clarity of the instructions provided by Ground Control and the adequacy of the information regarding taxiway restrictions during the construction phase.
Findings
- The crew made an inadequate judgment by entering taxiway L4, despite being aware of the aircraft's 60.4-meter wingspan and observing markings on taxiway R.
- The NOTAM regarding the restrictions on taxiway L4 was not clear enough, leading to ambiguity for both the flight crew and the air traffic controller.
- There were discrepancies between different Aerodrome Charts and the operator's safety bulletins, creating a confusing navigational environment.
- The restriction information for taxiway L4 (limiting operations to aircraft with a maximum wingspan of 36 meters) was not included in the ATIS broadcast.
- The Air Traffic Control Unit provided inadequate instructions by directing the wide-body aircraft to proceed via the restricted taxiway L4.
- Coordination and supervision between the aerodrome operator, ANAC, and the Airspace Control Detachment regarding risk management during construction were insufficient.