What happened
On November 9, 2011, an AS365 N3, registration I-DAMS, was conducting a Helicopter Emergency Medical Service (HEMS) mission from Caltanissetta to Messina. The flight, carrying two pilots, two medical crew members, and one patient, was being operated under Visual Flight Rules (VFR).
As the aircraft progressed eastward, visibility began to deteriorate significantly due to worsening weather conditions near the Erei Mountains. The crew requested radar vectoring from Catania Approach to assist with navigation. In response, air traffic controllers advised the crew to climb to an altitude of 3,000–4,000 feet to establish radar contact and exit the clouds.
Despite communicating their intention to climb, the aircraft's altitude remained nearly constant. At 08:59 UTC, the helicopter struck the top of a tree on a hillside. The impact caused the tail rotor to separate from the airframe. The aircraft then struck a hillside at approximately 1,500 feet, rolling down the slope. The accident resulted in one fatality (the co-pilot) and four injuries (the remaining crew and the patient).
The investigation
The ANSV investigation focused on the flight's planning, the crew's decision-making, and the aircraft's performance in deteriorating visibility. Investigators examined the flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and the wreckage at the site near Borgo Pietro Lupo.
Analysis of the flight parameters revealed that while the crew declared an intention to climb and use vertical speed and heading modes, these functions were only engaged six seconds before the impact. Furthermore, the investigation noted a significant increase in airspeed from 48 to 89 knots just before the crash, suggesting the crew may have experienced spatial disorientation due to the lack of visual references.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was a controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) following an impact with a tree and subsequent impact with the ground.
- The crew's decision to continue the flight under VFR despite visibility falling below legal minimums was a significant contributing factor.
- Inadequate mission planning failed to account for the critical microclimates along the planned route.
- Poor Crew Resource Management (CRM) was evident, characterized by a lack of cooperation between the two pilots and a failure to execute the intended climb.
- There was a notable lack of situational awareness and a resistance to transitioning from VFR to IFR flight rules, despite both pilots holding instrument ratings.