What happened
On the night of January 6, 2011, a Ryanair Boeing 737-800, registration EI-EFX, was operating a scheduled international flight from East Midlands to Alicante. During the approach to runway 28, the crew requested a direct arrival to the 8-mile fix. The Valencia approach controller approved the request and coordinated with the Alicante tower to accept the aircraft. However, the controller did not explicitly instruct the crew to switch to the tower frequency.
Due to the good visibility and the lack of other radio traffic, the crew subconsciously assumed they were cleared to land. The aircraft landed at 2/21:57 UTC without ever contacting the Alicante tower. The crew only realized the error after landing and being instructed by a marshaller not to park, as the tower controller was attempting to establish contact. There were no injuries among the 166 passengers and 6 crew members, and the aircraft sustained no damage.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation examined the communication logs between Valencia approach (TACC) and Alicante tower (TWR). It established that while the approach controller had coordinated the arrival, the transfer of communications was never completed. The crew had kept the approach frequency selected on their primary radio (COM1) and were using the ATIS frequency on COM2 with the volume turned down to avoid distractions.
Furthermore, the investigation found that the tower controller had not attempted to contact the aircraft on the tower frequency or the emergency frequency prior to landing, despite the aircraft's arrival being expected. The investigation also noted that the crew failed to complete the final item of their landing checklist, which involved turning on the landing lights, a task typically performed upon receiving landing clearance.
Findings
- The primary cause was the crew's failure to request landing clearance, driven by a subconscious belief that they had already been cleared to land.
- The Valencia approach controller failed to inform the crew of the specific frequency required to contact the tower.
- The Alicante tower controller failed to monitor the aircraft's progress or attempt to establish contact via the tower or emergency frequencies.
- The crew had intentionally reduced the volume on the COM2 radio, which prevented them from hearing potential communications on the emergency frequency.
- The landing checklist was not fully completed, specifically the activation of landing lights.