What happened
On 27 March 2013, a Ryanair B 737-800, registration EI-DLE, was performing a scheduled international passenger flight from Alicante Airport. During the takeoff rotation on runway 28, the aircraft's tail section made contact with the runway surface. The crew initially noted a strange sensation and suspected a tailstrike, a suspicion later confirmed by cabin crew who reported hearing a noise at the end of the takeoff run.
Following the takeoff, the aircraft continued an uninterrupted climb to FL220. During the descent, while passing through 13,600 ft, the captain manually opened the outflow valve as part of a procedure, which resulted in a sudden cabin depressurization and the activation of the cabin altitude alarm. The crew utilized oxygen masks until reaching a safe altitude. The aircraft landed at the departure airport without further incident, and a subsequent inspection confirmed marks on the aft fuselage, though the damage was minor enough to allow the aircraft to be dispatched without repairs.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation examined the rotation technique, the aircraft's pressurization system, and the communication between the flight crew and Air Traffic Control (ATC). The investigation found that the aircraft was properly trimmed and configured for takeoff. However, during rotation, the pilot flying applied a corrective bank input of up to 48 degrees to offset a wind gust. This caused the left-side spoilers to deploy and increased the rotation rate to 5°/s, which exceeded the recommended 2°/s to 3°/s. This excessive pitch, reaching 11.7°, caused the tail to strike the runway.
Regarding the depressurization, the investigation established that the crew's manual manipulation of the outflow valve led to the rapid change in cabin pressure. Furthermore, the investigation highlighted a breakdown in runway safety management; because the ATC personnel did not fully understand the term "tailstrike" (potentially confusing it with "birdstrike"), they authorized another aircraft to take off and another to land before the runway had been inspected for debris.
Findings
- The primary cause of the tailstrike was an excessive rate of rotation during takeoff, driven by a corrective control input to compensate for a wind gust, which triggered spoiler deployment and reduced lift.
- The sudden cabin depressurization was caused by the crew's manual operation of the outflow valve.
- The flight crew delayed performing the required QRH Tail Strike procedure.
- ATC communications were deficient, as controllers lacked specific training regarding the hazards of tailstrikes and the potential for runway debris.
- The takeoff rotation rate peaked at 5°/s, significantly higher than the recommended parameters.