What happened
On May 27, 2012, at approximately 05:00 UTC, a Boeing 737-800 operated by Ryanair (callsign RYR6363) was on final approach to runway 02 at Barcelona-El Prat Airport. The airport was in the process of transitioning from its nighttime preferred configuration (ENR) to its daytime configuration (WRL). Under the ENR configuration, runway 02 is active for landings.
Simultaneously, an Airbus A320 operated by Air France (registration F-GJVG) was taxiing from the south apron toward the runway 25L holding point. The ground controller, acting under the assumption that runway 02 was inactive, cleared the Airbus A320 to cross runway 02 via taxiway K. To facilitate this movement, the ground controller deactivated the stop bar on taxiway K7, which is designed to protect the intersection of the taxiway and the active runway.
As the Airbus A320 approached the intersection, the local controller noticed the imminent incursion and alerted the ground controller. Although the ground controller attempted to instruct the Airbus A320 to hold its position, the aircraft had already crossed the holding point. Consequently, the local controller ordered the Boeing 737-800 to initiate a go-around. The Boeing 737-800 successfully executed the maneuver and landed without further incident on a subsequent approach.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation focused on the coordination between the ground and local controllers and the adequacy of controller training. Investigators found that the ground controller had not practiced managing runway 02 during his recent training period because the runway had been closed for construction work. This lack of recent experience with the ENR configuration led the controller to treat the runway as inactive. Furthermore, the investigation noted that the ground controller did not coordinate the runway crossing clearance with the local controller, and the stop bar was manually deactivated without proper oversight.
Findings
- The ground controller cleared the Airbus A320 to cross runway 02 without coordinating with the local controller.
- The ground controller deactivated the K7 stop bar, which was intended to protect the active runway, without consulting the local controller.
- The ground controller's familiarity with the airport was limited regarding the ENR configuration due to a lack of recent practical training on that specific setup.
- The training plan and competence scheme for the Barcelona tower did not mandate minimum duty periods in all preferred or changing configurations.