Flight History
The crew began their day at Barajas Airport on 5 June 2007 around 06:55 local time. The aircraft, an MD-83 (registration OE-LMM), was operated by MAP under a wet lease for Air Plus Comet. The first flight was from Madrid-Barajas to Lanzarote. During taxi, fault indications appeared for the Stall IND FAILURE, Flight Director, AHRS Basic mode, and EPR limit flag systems. The copilot attempted to reset them. The crew performed a flex takeoff from runway 36L. During the takeoff run with autothrottle engaged, the throttle levers automatically retarded to 2°, and the EPR fell to 1.1. The crew manually advanced the throttles and continued to Lanzarote without further incident.
The second flight from Lanzarote to Barcelona departed at 10:45 local time from runway 03, with the copilot as pilot flying. The same fault indications occurred during taxi. After rotation at approximately 145 kt, the stick shaker activated, and the aircraft rolled to 63° right and 60° left. The captain retracted the landing gear about 25–30 seconds after liftoff while the oscillations continued until the aircraft exceeded 200 kt. The aircraft climbed to 5,000 ft. The crew initially decided to continue but reversed the decision and returned to Lanzarote. No emergency was declared. The landing was normal, and no injuries occurred.
Crew Information
The captain, male, 60 years old, held an ATPL with 21,000 total flight hours (7,700 on type). The copilot, male, 36 years old, held a CPL with 2,180 total flight hours (2,000 on type). Both had rested the day before the incident and had been flying together for the previous two weeks.
Maintenance and Configuration
After landing, the crew contacted maintenance personnel at Barajas and learned that the circuit breaker for the left ground control relay had been found tripped on the same aircraft the day before. They checked the circuit breaker panel and found it tripped. The takeoff warning system (TOWS) was not checked before engine start. The takeoff was conducted with slats retracted and flaps up. TOWS did not warn of the incorrect configuration because the left ground control relay circuit breaker was open, placing the aircraft in flight mode (TOWS only works on the ground). The aircraft had been in flight mode since the previous maintenance check. The maintenance task card for strobe light inspection did not specify tagging or collaring of opened circuit breakers, though the AMM instructs such procedures.