What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on 2014-09-17 involved a Boeing 738, registration EI-EBC, at Aeropuerto de Málaga (Málaga), ES.

What was the probable cause of the accident?

The incident was caused by the controller clearing an aircraft to land on a runway that was still occupied by a departing aircraft, compounded by improper management of separation and inadequate controller training/evaluation protocols for emergency situations.

Two Boeing 737s narrowly avoid collision at Malaga Airport

An air traffic controller cleared a landing aircraft to land on an occupied runway, leading to a dangerous loss of separation between two Boeing 737s.

What happened

On 17 September 2014, at Malaga-Costa del Sol Airport, a runway incursion and near-miss occurred involving two Boeing 737 aircraft. The first aircraft, a Boeing 737-8AS with registration EI-EBC operated by Ryanair, was on approach to runway 13 from Leeds Bradford. Simultaneously, a Boeing 7 .37-8Z9 with registration G-GDFR operated by Jet2.com was preparing for takeoff from the same runway.

The local controller (LCL) decided to clear the Jet2.com aircraft to enter the runway and take off after the landing of another aircraft, but before the arrival of the Ryanair flight. The controller instructed the Ryanair crew to expect a late landing clearance. However, while the Jet2.com aircraft was performing its takeoff run, the Ryanair crew initiated a go-around maneuver near the runway threshold. During this maneuver, the two aircraft reached a separation of only 0.5 NM horizontally and 100 ft vertically.

The investigation

The CIAIAC investigation examined the flight paths, air traffic control communications, and the training protocols of the air navigation service provider. The investigation reconstructed the flight paths and analyzed the controller's actions, noting that the controller cleared the Ryanair aircraft to land while the runway was still occupied by the departing Jet2.com aircraft.

Investigators also reviewed the controller's use of traffic information, finding that the controller provided headings rather than necessary traffic information to the departing aircraft. Furthermore, the investigation scrutinized the competence assessment and training methods used by ENAIRE, the air navigation service provider, specifically regarding how controllers are evaluated for emergency and special situations.

Findings

The primary cause of the incident was the decision to issue a landing clearance to an aircraft on an occupied runway.
A secondary failure occurred when the separation between the two aircraft was improperly managed, compromising safety.
The departing aircraft, G-GHDFR, was accelerating at a slower rate than the controller had anticipated, which contributed to the loss of separation.
The controller failed to provide adequate traffic information to the departing aircraft to expedite or halt the takeoff.
The training and evaluation procedures used by the air navigation service provider did not sufficiently guarantee that the controller was proficient in handling such high-workload or abnormal situations.

Safety action

REC 38/16: It is recommended that ENAIRE implement changes to organizational procedures to ensure training and evaluation methods guarantee proper proficiency levels for controllers in all operating situations.
REC 39/16: It is recommended that AESA ensure all certified companies use training and evaluation methods that ensure proper proficiency levels for air traffic controllers.