What happened
On December 20, 2001, at La Palma Airport, a Boeing 737-800, registration D-AHFV, was preparing for an international flight to Munich with 106 passengers on board. While taxiing from parking stand number 4, the crew received instructions from the Tower Control to proceed via Gate B. As the aircraft turned right to follow the taxi path, the crew noted that the clearance between their aircraft and a parked Boeing 737-800, registration D-ABAZ, appeared insufficient.
The crew halted the aircraft and requested assistance. The Tower Controller contacted a "Follow Me" vehicle to verify if the maneuver was possible. The ground marshal, after observing the area, signaled the aircraft to proceed. During the maneuver, the right winglet of D-AHFV struck the right horizontal stabilizer of the stationary D-ABAZ. The impact caused the crew members to sustain minor injuries, including a flight attendant hitting her head and another experiencing neck and back pain. The collision resulted in structural damage to both aircraft: the winglet of D-AHFV was broken, and the horizontal stabilizer of D-ABAZ suffered deformation and attachment damage.
The investigation
The investigation examined the physical constraints of the La Palma apron, which is limited by the island's difficult topography. The investigation established that the apron lacks sufficient depth to allow large aircraft to pass behind one another safely.
Investigators found that the Tower Control issued taxi instructions that contradicted existing airport operational procedures. Specifically, internal instructions required aircraft at stands 1-4 to use Gate A, yet the crew was directed to use Gate B. Furthermore, the investigation determined that the ground marshal failed to accurately assess the collision risk and did not provide effective visual signals to stop the aircraft once the collision became imminent.
Findings
- The primary cause of the collision was the insufficient physical space available on the apron to allow a Boeing 737-800 to pass behind another aircraft of similar dimensions.
- Tower Control issued taxi authorizations that did not align with established safety procedures for the airport's operational conditions.
- The ground marshal's risk assessment was erroneous, and they failed to intervene effectively to prevent the impact.
- Existing airport instructions regarding parking and taxiing were only directed at marshals and did not involve the flight crews or Tower Control, leading to a lack of coordinated safety awareness.