What happened
On January 28, 1999, an AOM Minerve S.A. Boeing 737-53C, registration F-GHUL, arrived at Nice Airport on a scheduled flight from Paris-Orly. As the aircraft was taxiing to parking stand 44, the crew utilized a newly installed automated laser guidance system to assist with docking.
During the final stages of the approach, the aircraft's left engine struck the jet bridge. The impact caused a perforation approximately 30 centimeters in both length and width on the upper cowling of the left engine's air intake. The aircraft eventually came to a halt 2.9 meters beyond the designated stop mark. The incident resulted in minor damage to both the aircraft and the fixed portion of the jet bridge.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the functionality of the new automated guidance system and the procedures surrounding its implementation. Investigators examined the laser-based system, which was designed to identify the aircraft type and provide visual distance and directional cues to the pilot, potentially replacing the need for a ground marshaller.
Technical simulations conducted by the manufacturer, Safegate, alongside the BEA, confirmed that the guidance system itself was not malfunctioning. However, the investigation revealed that the jet bridge had been moved forward by 0.40 meters before the aircraft had come to a complete stop. This movement placed the bridge within the sensor's field of view. When the aircraft's nose was within four meters of the stop point, the system's laser focused on the encroaching bridge to verify if it was the aircraft's nose, causing a temporary freeze in distance information. During this brief window, the aircraft continued forward, striking the bridge.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the movement of the jet bridge before the aircraft had fully stopped, which provided the pilot with erroneous guidance information.
- The automated guidance system's display instructed the pilot to continue advancing because it was momentarily preoccupied with identifying the obstacle (the bridge) rather than the aircraft nose.
- The implementation of the new technology lacked adequate coordination; the system had been made operational without formal notification to airlines or the manufacturer, and without a formal training program for all relevant stakeholders.
- There was a lack of standardized procedures regarding the management of new airport ground equipment and the communication of such changes to flight crews.