What happened
On February 8, 1999, an EL AL cargo flight, operating a Boeing 747-245F with registration 4X-AXK, arrived at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol from New York. The flight was operating under challenging meteorological conditions, as a cold front bringing thunderstorms, rain, and snow was active in the area.
During the approach, air traffic control reassigned the aircraft from runway 01R to runway 01L. While the crew recalculated their required landing distance based on the new runway, they were under the impression that the braking action on 01L was comparable to that of 01R. Shortly after landing, the crew realized the aircraft was not decelerating as expected. Despite attempts to use braking and nose-wheel steering, the aircraft could not be stopped on the pavement. The Boeing 747-245F traveled past the end of runway 01L, coming to a halt in the mud approximately 30 meters beyond the runway threshold, with the forward wheels of the main landing gear partially submerged in the soft ground.
The investigation
The Dutch Safety Board examined the sequence of events, focusing on the communication between air traffic control and the flight crew, as well as the rapidly changing weather. The investigation looked into the accuracy of the braking action reports provided via the ATIS system and the specific runway conditions at the time of touchdown. Investigators also reviewed the crew's performance during the automated landing and their use of radio telephony.
Findings
- Rapidly changing weather conditions caused a localized snow and rain shower to pass over the northern section of runway 01L just before the aircraft landed, significantly worsening the surface slipperiness.
- The deterioration of braking action on the final part of the runway was the primary cause of the overrun.
- Non-standard radio telephony phraseology used by both the crew and air traffic controllers led to a misunderstanding regarding the specific braking action on the newly assigned runway.
- The crew was unaware that the braking action on the third part of runway 01L had degraded to POOR due to the recent precipitation.
- The automated landing was performed at a final approach speed that was approximately 13 knots higher than the calculated target speed, further increasing the required stopping distance.
Safety action
Following the investigation, several recommendations were made to improve safety:
- Schiphol Group, Air Traffic Control Netherlands, and the KNMI were advised to review the RCR/CCIS/ATIS systems to ensure more timely and accurate information reaches crews during rapid weather changes.
- EL AL was recommended to review its approach and landing procedures, specifically regarding speed control during autoland operations.
- A recommendation was issued for both air traffic controllers and flight crews to strictly adhere to standard ICAO radio telephony phraseology to prevent communication errors.