What happened
On October 11, 2002, an Embraer E145, registration I-EXME, was operating a scheduled passenger flight from Nice to Rome Fiumicino. The flight was also serving as a "line training under supervision" session for a pilot undergoing a conversion course. The cockpit was occupied by a line instructor acting as Pilot Flying (PF), a trainee pilot acting as Pilot Not Flying (PNF), and a third qualified pilot in the jumpseat.
During the final approach, the instructor decided to switch roles with the trainee to allow for a visual approach as part of the training program. To facilitate this, the instructor intentionally tuned out the ILS frequencies for runway 16C. While the aircraft was cleared to land on runway 16C, a crosswind component of approximately 6 knots caused the aircraft to drift laterally. The aircraft subsequently landed on runway 16L, which was closed for maintenance work. None of the three pilots realized they had landed on the wrong runway until the tower controller intervened after observing the aircraft's position on the ASMI radar.
The investigation
The ANSV investigation examined the cockpit procedures, the visibility of runway markings, and the capabilities of the air traffic control tower. The investigation found that the trainee pilot was performing a visual approach without the use of instrument references. The investigation also noted that the tower controller was unable to visually distinguish which runway the aircraft was aligned with from their position, only identifying the error via radar after the landing had occurred.
Findings
- The primary cause of the serious occurrence was a lack of crew integration and a subsequent loss of situational awareness by the entire crew.
- The crew's attention was heavily focused on the training objectives, which led to a lack of cross-checking instruments and a failure to monitor the aircraft's position.
- The decision to swap pilot roles during an advanced phase of the approach contributed to the error.
- The runway 16L closure markings, while present, did not meet the full quantity required by ICAO standards.
- The tower controller lacked the technical tools or visual vantage point to differentiate between the two parallel runways during the final approach.
- The crew did not inform the controller that they were performing a training approach using only visual references.