What happened
On the evening of 22 December 2003, an Easyjet Boeing 737-700, registration G-EZJM, was taxiing toward a runway at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol. The aircraft, carrying 98 passengers and five crewmembers, was operating in freezing conditions characterized by precipitation. During the taxi sequence, the flight crew deviated from the route instructed by air traffic control, opting instead for an alternative path. As the aircraft attempted a turn on taxiway VS, the nose wheel steering became unresponsive due to the icy surface. This caused the aircraft to skid toward the side of the apron, resulting in a collision between the left wing and a lamppost. The impact caused serious damage to both the aircraft and the light pole. While there were no fatalities, one passenger sustained light injuries and another experienced physical complaints following the evacuation.
The investigation
The Dutch Safety Board examined the operational procedures at Schiphol, the performance of air traffic control, and the crew's decision-making. The investigation revealed that the airport's response to the freezing weather was delayed. Although a state of readiness for slipperiness had been active, the coordination between the airport's snow office and external parties was insufficient. Specifically, the investigation found that the preventative gritting of landside areas started much later than necessary, and the decision to prioritize certain taxiways left others, such as the route taken by the aircraft, untreated. Furthermore, the investigation noted that the airport's ATIS (Automatic Terminal Information Service) provided inaccurate and non-standard information, using the term "slippery spots" rather than standardized ICAO terminology, and failed to provide timely updates regarding the specific hazards on taxiways.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the loss of steering control due to ice on the taxiway surface.
- The airport's actions to combat slipperiness were suboptimal and failed to cover the specific taxiway and apron areas involved in the incident.
- The flight crew did not follow the specific taxi instructions provided by air traffic control.
- There was a lack of effective Crew Resource Management (CRM) during the taxi, as the crew did not communicate their decision to change routes.
- Air traffic controllers were not fully aware of the extent of the slipperiness on the specific taxiways being used.
- The airport's safety management system failed to adequately monitor or audit the regulations governing snow and ice control.