What happened
On June 16, 2012, a series of runway incursions occurred at Amsterdam Airport Schiphol involving nine different aircraft. During a period of high traffic demand, preparations were underway to activate runway 18L for departures in addition to the existing use of runway 24. However, the runway had not yet been formally handed over from the airport authorities to Air Traffic Control Netherlands (LVNL).
Despite the runway not being officially available, the first aircraft departed from 18L at 20:28. Eight subsequent aircraft followed, utilizing intersection E4 to access the runway. The tenth aircraft attempted to use intersection E3, which triggered the discovery of the error. Because the pilots of the preceding nine flights observed no unusual conditions on the runway, they were unaware they were operating on a runway that had not been properly commissioned for use.
The investigation
The investigation by the Dutch Safety Board (OVV) focused on the handover process between Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (AAS) and LVNL. Investigators examined the technical systems used to monitor runway availability, specifically the Runway Availability Panel, and the procedures for changing runway configurations.
It was established that the handover process for returning or requesting runways was not governed by formal, written regulations. Instead, the process relied on a verbal notification provided by an assistant in the control tower. The investigation also looked into the functionality of stopbars—lighting systems designed to prevent unauthorized runway entries—and how they interact with the runway availability status.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was that runway 18L had not been made available to LVNL by the airport authorities.
- There were no formal, written procedures in the control tower for the frequent configuration changes required at Schiphol.
- The handover process was based on an informal, verbal warning system that failed to reach all necessary personnel.
- The runway controller only realized the error when attempting to switch off a stopbar at intersection E3, which was impossible because the runway status was not correctly updated.
- The pilots were unable to detect the error because the physical runway conditions appeared normal.
- This incident was part of a pattern, as nine similar incidents involving unavailable runways had occurred at Schliphol since 2007.