What happened
On 4 June 2001, a Piper PA-28-161, registration G-BJBW, was conducting a private cross-country flight from Popham Airfield, Hampshire, to Chatteris Airfield, Cambridges bridges. Upon approaching Chatteris, the pilot attempted radio contact on the occasional air/ground frequency but received no response. After observing the wind conditions, the pilot initially considered Runway 29 but aborted the approach due to visible obstructions.
The pilot then repositioned for an approach to Runway 01, a grass strip measuring 570 metres. Despite being aware of telegraph poles obstructing the approach path, the pilot performed a sideslip to lose altitude before landing. The aircraft touched down with only approximately one-third to one-half of the runway remaining. Upon applying full braking, the pilot was unable to halt the aircraft before it reached the end of the runway. The aircraft slewed slightly to the right and overran the airfield, crossing a one-metre-deep ditch before coming to a stop three metres beyond the runway boundary. The incident resulted in no injuries, though the aircraft sustained damage to the nosewheel, propeller, engine mounts, starboard main gear, and starboard wing.
The investigation
Investigators examined the approach path and the availability of aeronautical information. The pilot had utilized a current VFR flight guide for flight planning, which did not indicate any obstructions on the approach. While the pilot had contacted the aerodrome operator for permission to land, no information regarding the telegraph poles was provided.
Furthermore, the investigation reviewed the landing performance requirements. The manufacturer's handbook for the Piper PA-28-161 specifies a landing distance of 343 metres from 50 feet and a 177-metre landing roll for a dry, paved runway. The pilot noted an inability to accurately judge the remaining runway length at the moment of touchdown. The investigation also considered the regulatory environment of Chatteris, an unlicensed aerodrome, noting that while it was not bound by CAP 168 licensing, it was subject to CAP 428 guidelines regarding obstacle management and pilot notification.
Findings
- The primary cause of the overrun was the insufficient remaining runway length to safely stop the aircraft after touchdown.
- The pilot was unaware of the specific location of the obstructions on the approach due to the lack of information in the VFR flight guide and the lack of notification from the aerodrome operator.
- The landing was performed on a grass surface, which requires greater stopping distances than the paved surfaces used in manufacturer performance calculations.
- There was a failure to apply necessary safety factors to the landing distance, as recommended by CAA safety leaflets, which suggest increasing distances by 20% for grass surfaces and up to 43% for less favorable conditions.