What happened
On January 11, 2018, at approximately 10:11 AM, a Cessna 525A, registration N525FF, performed an unauthorized takeoff from Runway 19 at Reykjavik Airport (BIRK). At the time of the incident, the airport was managing poor braking action due to freezing temperatures and rain. An airport service vehicle was actively sanding Runway 13 to improve surface conditions.
While the Air Traffic Controller (ATCO) was managing multiple communications—including coordinating inbound domestic flights and ground vehicle movements—the flight crew of N525FF proceeded to takeoff without receiving takeoff clearance. As the aircraft rotated and approached the intersection of Runway 19 and Runway 13, the pilot observed the sanding truck crossing the runway. The minimum distance between the aircraft and the truck was estimated to be less than one meter before the aircraft lifted off and flew over the vehicle.
The investigation
The investigation examined ATC recordings and crew statements to reconstruct the sequence of events. The ATCO was simultaneously communicating with inbound aircraft, ground vehicles, and the flight crew of N5 and 5FF. While communications with the Cessna 525A crew were conducted in English, the ATCO's communications with domestic aircraft and ground services were conducted in Icelandic.
The investigation also reviewed the pilot's actions. The pilot flying (PF) stated that after turning to line up on the runway, the crew believed they were ready for departure. The PF noted that upon increasing thrust, the aircraft began to slide on the ice, leading to the decision to commence the takeoff roll. However, ATC recordings indicated that the flight crew did not transmit a message stating they were "ready for departure," nor did they receive a formal takeoff clearance.
Findings
- The flight crew of N525FF initiated the takeoff roll without receiving takeoff clearance from the ATCO.
- The flight crew was unaware that Runway 13 was being sanded because the relevant ATC communications regarding the sanding operation were conducted in Icelandic, which the non-Icelandic crew could not understand.
- The pilot's decision to accelerate was influenced by the aircraft sliding on the ice during the initial application of thrust.
- The ATCO failed to include the "and wait" instruction (e.g., "Line up and wait") which would have been appropriate given the authorized movement of service vehicles across the runway.
Safety action
- The investigation recommends that ICETRA review the Iceland AIP regarding communications at Reykjavik Airport to ensure that English is used for all ATC radio communications whenever at least one aircraft on the ground or tower frequencies is communicating in English.