What happened
On March 29, 2018, at 14:21:52, a near mid-air collision occurred north of Langavatn, above Reykjavík, involving two aircraft operating in visual flight rules (VFR) conditions. The first aircraft, a Textron Aviation Inc. 150L with registration TF-TWO, was on a private flight. The crew, consisting of a pilot familiarizing himself with the type and an experienced passenger, was transitioning from Sandskeið to Reykjavík via Route 3. During the flight, the crew was communicating with the Reykjavík tower regarding a helicopter in the vicinity.
The second aircraft, a Costruzioni Aeronautiche Tecmbam S.r.l. P2002-JF registered as TF-IFB, was conducting a flight training session. The instructor and student were flying from the East Area toward Reykjavík. While attempting to contact the Reykjavík tower, the instructor initially failed to establish communication, only successfully reaching the controller at 14:21:43.
As the aircraft approached Langavatn, the TF-IFB crossed the flight path of the TF-TWO at a vertical separation of approximately 90 feet and a horizontal distance of only 35 meters. The TF-IFB flew from the rear right of the TF-TWO, passed in front of it to the left, and then performed a right turn, descending below the altitude of the TF-TWO. The crew of the TF-TWO reported they did not see the approaching aircraft due to the high-wing configuration of their plane until the conflict had already occurred. The aircraft later passed within 140 meters horizontally and 200 feet vertically during a second close encounter.
The investigation
The RNSA examined radio communications from the Reykjavík tower. The investigation established that the controller was managing a high workload, handling both arrival traffic and significant ground traffic, as landings were closed that day due to the observed holiday. While the controller had provided pertinent traffic information to the TF-TWO crew regarding a helicopter and another inbound aircraft, the controller was simultaneously engaged in heavy communications with ground vehicles and other aircraft when the TF-IFB requested entry into the arrival route.
Findings
- The controller provided necessary traffic information to the TF-TWO crew, but the timing of the TF-IFB's arrival into the route coincided with the controller's active communication with other traffic.
- The pilot of the TF-IFB continued toward the start of Route 3 without receiving prior authorization following an initial failed communication attempt.
- The high-wing design of the TF-TWO contributed to the crew's inability to visually detect the TF-IFB before the close encounter.