What happened
On February 20, 2024, at 14:25 local time, a near-collision occurred during the final approach to runway 19 at Keflavík Airport. The first aircraft, an Airbus 320 (registration TF-PPB) operating flight FPY6001, was conducting visual flight rules (VFR) landing practice. The aircraft had been performing touch-and-go landings for approximately 90 minutes.
At the same time, a Boeing 737-8 (registration TF-ICG) operating flight ICE29E was on instrument flight rules (IFR) approach, descending through clouds. The air traffic control position at the tower was being manned by a trainee controller under the supervision of an On-the-Job Training Instructor (OJTI2).
At 14:22, the trainee controller informed the crew of TF-PPB that they were number one for landing, noting they required a 3 NM final approach. Shortly thereafter, the controller provided traffic information to the Boeing 737-8, stating it was number two behind traffic turning right base. However, the information provided regarding the position of the preceding aircraft was inaccurate; the Airbus 320 was actually much closer to the runway than the 9 NM distance reported by the controller.
As the Boeing 737-8 descended below the cloud layer, the crew observed the Airbus 320 on their TCAS. The two aircraft were on intersecting paths at similar altitudes. The minimum vertical separation between the aircraft was recorded at only 50 feet, while the minimum longitudinal separation was 1.56 NM.
The investigation
The RNSA investigation examined the sequence of communications, the radar data, and the training environment in the tower. The investigation established that the trainee controller had instructed the Airbus 320 crew to expect traffic at 9 NM, whereas the Boeing 737-8 had already passed that point and was only 7.2 NM from the runway.
Investigators also reviewed the controller's instructions to the Boeing 737-8. When the trainee identified the preceding traffic, the specific type of aircraft was not described, which is a requirement under local operating procedures (MANOPS) to ensure easy identification. Furthermore, the investigation noted that the instructor had assumed the Airbus 320 would fly a wider pattern, whereas the crew was following a standardized, tighter pattern used during their practice session.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was inaccurate traffic information provided to the aircraft, specifically regarding the distance and position of the preceding aircraft on the base leg.
- The trainee controller's instruction to the Airbus 320 regarding traffic at 9 NM was incorrect, as the Boeing 737-8 was already much closer to the runway.
- The controller failed to identify the type of preceding traffic when instructing the Boeing 737-8, which is necessary for clear identification.
- The presence of on-the-job training in the tower influenced the handling of the traffic.
- The aircraft were operating in Class D airspace, where separation between VFR and IFR traffic is not mandatory unless specifically requested by the VFR crew.