Incident Overview
On 6 October 2024, a serious air traffic incident occurred near Reykjavik Airport (BIRK) when two training aircraft, a Textron 150L (registration TF-TWO) and a Diamond DA-20-C1 (registration TF-FGC), experienced a loss of separation. Both aircraft were conducting training flights with an instructor and a student on board, and both were performing touch-and-go landings in the left-hand traffic pattern for runway 01. TF-TWO was ahead in the pattern.
At 12:50:57, the flight paths of the two aircraft crossed over Kópavogur, south of Kársnes, at an altitude of 400 feet. According to surveillance data, the minimum vertical separation was 0 feet at 12:50:53, with a lateral distance of 0.12 nautical miles (222 meters). The minimum lateral separation occurred at 12:51:02, measuring 0.02 nautical miles (37 meters) with a vertical separation of 100 feet (30 meters).
Sequence of Events
From approximately 12:30, both aircraft were in the traffic pattern. At 12:44, an ATR-72 (F-OMYN) contacted the tower controller, who informed the pilot that he was number three to land behind the two small aircraft. The controller then cleared TF-TWO for a touch-and-go.
At 12:45, a helicopter (EHR60) requested departure from runway 13, which was approved. Another helicopter (EHR52) also requested departure and was told to wait. At 12:46, TF-FGC was cleared for a touch-and-go. At 12:47, EHR52 was cleared for takeoff with instructions to stay east of the final approach path.
At 12:48, F-OMYN was cleared to land. At 12:49, the controller informed TF-TWO that they were number two behind the ATR-72. The student in TF-TWO acknowledged and reported sighting the traffic. TF-TWO had extended its downwind leg to follow F-OMYN, while TF-FGC was turning from crosswind to downwind.
At 12:50:10, F-OMYN landed. The controller then handled communications with EHR52, EHR60, and F-OMYN's taxi instructions. At 12:50:28, TF-TWO turned onto final approach over Arnarnesvogur, while TF-FGC turned onto base leg over Bessastaðanes. At 12:50:57, their paths intersected.
At 12:50:58, the controller called TF-FGC, informing them they were too close to traffic. Immediately after, TF-TWO announced a go-around. The controller then asked TF-FGC if they had cut in front of TF-TWO; the student in TF-FGC replied that they had not seen the traffic.
Contributing Factors
The investigation found that the student/instructor of TF-FGC did not adequately monitor radio communications on the tower frequency. Furthermore, during the downwind leg, the crew of TF-FGC had poor visibility of the preceding aircraft because they were flying directly into the sun, which was low (20° above the horizon) and nearly due south (173°). The sun's position was consistent with the crew's report that they could not see TF-TWO well. The tower controller's attention was divided due to high traffic volume, with a measured frequency load of 87% between 12:44 and 12:50. The controller did not call TF-FGC until six seconds after completing other communications, by which time the aircraft were already in close proximity.
Investigation
The Icelandic Transportation Safety Board (RNSA) reviewed procedures from both flight schools, which required aircraft to be at 500 feet when turning final. TF-TWO was at 600 feet when turning final at 12:50:28, having extended downwind, and descended to 400 feet at the point of closest approach. TF-FGC was at 400 feet when turning from base to final at 12:50:57. The RNSA noted that the crew of TF-FGC turned onto base leg as in previous circuits, even though they could not see TF-TWO, which they knew was ahead.