What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on null involved a MD83,, registration EI-CMZ, at Roma MD83, IT.

What was the probable cause of the accident?

The primary cause was the flight crew's failure to follow the assigned taxi route, exacerbated by confusing airport signage and a lack of effective cross-checking during nighttime taxi operations.

Runway Incursion at Rome Fiumicino Involving MD-83

An Eurofly MD-83 mistakenly entered a taxiway connector leading to an active runway during a nighttime taxi at Rome Fiumicino, narrowly avoiding a conflict with an arriving aircraft.

What happened

On February 8, 2002, at approximately 17:20 UTC, an Eurofly MD-83, registration EI-CMZ, was taxiing at Rome Fiumicino Airport for a flight to London Gatwick. After receiving instructions from Ground Control to taxi via taxiways Y, A, and B toward runway 25, the crew failed to turn right onto taxiway A as directed. Instead, the aircraft entered connector AE, which leads directly onto runway 16R/34L.

At the time of the excursion, an arriving MD-82, registration I-DATM, was landing on runway 16R. The pilot of the Eurofly aircraft realized the error and stopped the aircraft several meters before entering the active runway. The Ground Controller intervened via radio to notify the crew of their position, confirming the aircraft had stopped before the runway threshold. No injuries or damage to the aircraft occurred, and no conflict between the two aircraft was established.

The investigation

The ANSV investigation examined the flight path, cockpit procedures, and airport infrastructure. The investigation reviewed the actions of the flight crew, the Ground Controller, and the pilot of the arriving aircraft. The inquiry also analyzed the airport's signage, lighting, and the visibility conditions at the time of the event, which was occurring during the evening transition.

Findings

The crew's error was driven by a failure to follow the assigned taxi route, likely due to difficulty identifying the correct taxiway.
A lack of cross-checking between the pilot and co-pilot may have contributed to the error, as the co-pilot might have relied too heavily on the commander's experience.
The airport's signage at the intersection of taxiways Y, A, and AE was potentially confusing; specifically, a sign (L1) was visible on the right side of taxiway Y, while the primary directional sign was on the left, making it difficult to observe from the cockpit.
The absence of "No Entry" or "Runway Ahead" markings at the start of connector AE contributed to the incident.
The small angular difference (30°) between connector AE and taxiway A, combined with nighttime visibility, may have facilitated the loss of situational awareness.

Safety action

The ANSV recommended that airports evaluate the installation of ground radar to assist controllers in monitoring aircraft movements when visual control is difficult.
Recommendations were made to improve airport signage, including moving directional signs to the left side of taxiways for better visibility, installing "No Entry" or "Runway Ahead" signs on connectors, and implementing Stop Bars at runway-adjacent taxiway intersections.