What happened
On February 3, 2004, during a scheduled passenger flight from Amsterdam to Copenhagen, a Boeing McDonnell Douglas MD-82, registration OY-KGT, experienced an in-flight incident involving smoke in the cabin. Approximately 20 minutes into the cruise phase, a cabin attendant reported smoke emanating from an overhead bin in the aft section of the aircraft.
In response, the flight crew declared an emergency and initiated an immediate return to Amsterdam Schiphol Airport. During the descent, the first officer identified the source of the smoke near the reading lights in the rows 27-29 area. Although the smoke dissipated before landing, the crew prepared the cabin for an emergency arrival. Upon landing, the aircraft was met by airport fire and rescue services and taxied to a remote area for inspection.
The investigation
Because the aircraft and crew had departed the Netherlands before the Dutch Safety Board was notified, the investigation relied on data provided by the aircraft manufacturer, the operator, and ground engineers. Technical inspections conducted at Schiphol revealed that a burnt ballast for the sidewall tubular lamps in the aft cabin was the source of the smoke.
Investigators analyzed the design of the ballast components, noting that certain units manufactured before August 2001 utilized a capacitor prone to overheating under specific ripple current conditions. While the ballast's internal protection systems successfully shut down the unit to prevent a larger fire, the investigation focused heavily on the crew's response and the adequacy of the emergency procedures used to manage the smoke.
Findings
While the crew successfully identified the smoke source and pulled the circuit breakers for the reading lights, they failed to isolate the electrical bus feeding the sidewall lights. The investigation determined that the emergency checklist used by the operator was insufficient for isolating the electrical source of the smoke.
Specifically, the crew did not pull the circuit breakers for the upper and lower sidewall cabin lights, meaning the electrical power to the malfunctioning component remained active. The investigation also noted that previous similar incidents involving the same operator's aircraft had resulted in recommendations to simplify or update smoke and fumes checklists, yet these improvements had not been effectively implemented for the OY-KGT flight.