What happened
On October 16, 2012, a Brit Air Bombardier CRJ-700, registration F-GRZE, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Paris Orly to Lorient Lann Bihoué. During the approach to runway 25, the crew was informed by air traffic control of significant weather conditions, including heavy rain, reduced visibility, and strong gusts. The controller specifically noted that the runway was wet with standing water and that a preceding aircraft had experienced aquaplaning.
The crew conducted an ILS approach with flaps set to 30°. While the approach was stable at 1,000 ft, the aircraft's ground speed remained high, and the pilot flying noted a high airspeed at 200 ft. The main gear touched down approximately 1,130 meters from the end of the runway. Despite applying maximum reverse thrust, the crew reported an inability to decelerate effectively. The aircraft subsequently exited the runway, striking localizer antennas with the left wing, before coming to a stop in a grassy field near the threshold of runway 07. All 53 passengers and the crew evacuated the aircraft safely, though the aircraft sustained heavy damage.
The investigation
The BEA investigation focused on the crew's decision-making process and the physical state of the runway. Investigators examined flight data from the FDR and cockpit communications from the CVR. The analysis included an evaluation of the runway's friction levels, the aircraft's performance during the landing roll, and the crew's management of threats and errors. The investigation also reviewed the operator's training procedures, fatigue management, and the aerodrome's maintenance of runway 25.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the crew's failure to decide to abort the landing despite being unaware of the true extent of the runway contamination and the limited remaining runway length.
- The crew underestimated the prevailing meteorological conditions.
- The crew's situational awareness was degraded by factors including fatigue, routine, and inadequate training in Threat and Error Management (TEM).
- The runway surface was contaminated with standing water, and the specific characteristics of runway 25 were not properly documented in the operator's manual.
- There was a lack of standardized phraseology between controllers and crews regarding the actual state of the runway.
- Operational instructions from the operator were occasionally unclear or contradictory, which hindered effective crew resource management.