Casualties unknown

Airprox Incident Between GNR310A and GMI2139 on 17 November 2003 near KORED (EC-HMK)

15 NM South KORED, CH

On November 17, 2003, a BOEING B737-800 (registration EC-HMK) was involved in an aviation accident near 15 NM South KORED, CH. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: Issuing by the trainee radar controller of an incorrect flight level clearance, detected by neither the coach nor by the coordinator. Factor affecting the evolution of the incident: The fact that the coach and the coordinator were not wearing headsets. This summary draws on records from the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST).

Sourcesthe Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST)Primary reportUpdated 2026-10-18Data APIEditorial standards

An airprox occurred between GNR310A (Boeing 737-8) and GMI2139 (Fokker 100) near KORED after a trainee controller cleared GNR310A to flight level 300 instead of 330, leading to a vertical separation of 100 ft.

History

On 17 November 2003 at 18:36 UTC, GMI2139, a Fokker 100 operated by Germania, reported flight level 340 on frequency 124.030 MHz. The radar controller cleared it direct DITON at flight level 340, then instructed descent to flight level 320 at 18:47 and handed it over to Zurich sector U2.

At the same time, GNR310A, a Boeing 737-8 operated by Futura International Airways for Gambia International Airlines, reported flight level 360 on frequency 128.155 MHz. A trainee radar controller identified it, cleared it via LAMUR-DITON at flight level 360, and noted speed at the pilot's discretion. Oral coordination with sector MS4/MA4 planned descent to flight level 330.

At 18:49, the trainee instructed GNR310A to descend to flight level 300 (not 330) at 2000 ft/min or more. The pilot read back flight level 300 correctly but the rate readback was unclear. The controller did not correct it.

At 18:51:01, the STCA activated. GNR310A was at flight level 327 descending, and GMI2139 was at flight level 320. The controller then instructed immediate climb to flight level 330, which the pilot did, noting he had been cleared to 300. The controller did not dispute this. The minimum vertical distance was 100 ft with 4.2 NM lateral separation; later 700 ft at 3.7 NM.

Findings

  • The incident occurred at 18:51:01, 15 NM SSW of KORED, in class C airspace at flight level 320.
  • Instrument flight rules applied.
  • GMI2139 was in contact with Zurich sector U2; GNR310A with Geneva sector MS5/MA5.
  • The coach and coordinator held appropriate licences; the radar controller was in training.
  • Both aircraft were on the same route (TDP-OMASI-LAMUR) with slightly converging headings.
  • GMI2139 flew at 405 kt, GNR310A at 435 kt.
  • The trainee cleared GNR310A to flight level 300 instead of 330; the pilot read back 300.
  • Neither the coach nor the coordinator detected the error.
  • The trainee entered flight level 330 on the control strip.
  • Both aircraft had TCAS; GNR310A's commander later reported that TCAS never issued a TA or RA.
  • GMI2139's commander did not notice anything.
  • Weather conditions were reported.

Analysis

GMI2139 and GNR310A were flying the same route to Munich, parallel at 4 NM lateral and 2000 ft vertical separation. GNR310A was slightly behind and faster, gradually closing the gap. GMI2139 descended to flight level 320 at 18:47 and was handed off to Zurich. GNR310A at flight level 360 was cleared to flight level 300 instead of 330 after coordination with MS4/MA4. The trainee transmitted flight level 300 but entered 330 on the strip, unable to explain the discrepancy. The pilot's readback was correct for 300 but the rate unclear. Three controllers worked the sector; none noticed the error. The lack of headsets for the coach and coordinator may have been a factor.

At 18:51, STCA alerted; GNR310A was passing flight level 327, descending, while GMI2139 was at flight level 320. The controller ordered immediate climb to flight level 330, which the pilot did, stating he had been cleared to 300.

Cause

Issuing by the trainee radar controller of an incorrect flight level clearance, detected by neither the coach nor by the coordinator.

Factor affecting the evolution of the incident: The fact that the coach and the coordinator were not wearing headsets.

Probable cause

Issuing by the trainee radar controller of an incorrect flight level clearance, detected by neither the coach nor by the coordinator. Factor affecting the evolution of the incident: The fact that the coach and the coordinator were not wearing headsets.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the 17 Nov 2003 BOEING B737-800 accident near 15 NM South KORED, CH?

An airprox occurred between GNR310A (Boeing 737-8) and GMI2139 (Fokker 100) near KORED after a trainee controller cleared GNR310A to flight level 300 instead of 330, leading to a vertical separation of 100 ft.

What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on 17 Nov 2003 involved a BOEING B737-800, registration EC-HMK, at 15 NM South KORED, CH.

What was the probable cause of the accident?

Issuing by the trainee radar controller of an incorrect flight level clearance, detected by neither the coach nor by the coordinator. Factor affecting the evolution of the incident: The fact that the coach and the coordinator were not wearing headsets.

Investigation report by the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST). Original record: https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-berichte/1860_e.pdf. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), Switzerland.