Casualties unknown

Airprox between CSA590 and D-IMUB in Zurich TMA on 30 July 2001 (OK-CGH)

TMA Zürich, CH

On July 30, 2001, a BOEING B737-500 (registration OK-CGH) was involved in an aviation accident near TMA Zürich, CH. This summary draws on records from the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST).

Sourcesthe Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST)Primary reportUpdated 2026-11-22Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered OK-CGH
Aircraft registered OK-CGH. Photo: Aero Icarus from Zürich, Switzerland / CC BY-SA 2.0, via Wikimedia Commons

Czech Airlines flight CSA590 (Boeing B735) and Cessna C414 D-IMUB came within 0.9 NM horizontally and 500 ft vertically in Zurich TMA after D-IMUB entered controlled airspace without clearance.

History

On 30 July 2001 at approximately 18:00 UTC, an airprox occurred in Zurich TMA between Czech Airlines flight CSA590 (Boeing B735, registration OK-CGH) and D-IMUB (Cessna C414). CSA590, arriving from Prague, was under radar guidance from the approach controller east (APE) for an ILS approach to runway 14. D-IMUB, a visual flight rules (VFR) flight from Arnsberg to Zurich, was in contact with the flight information centre (FIC).

As CSA590 was being vectored, the APE and the co-ordinator (CAP) noticed an unidentified aircraft (later identified as D-IMUB) approaching the TMA boundary from the north. The CAP instructed the FIC to ensure the aircraft avoided TMA Sector 5, including an orbit to the right if needed. Despite instructions, D-IMUB penetrated TMA Sector 5 at approximately 5500 ft, descending. The APE then instructed CSA590 to stop descent at FL 60 and provided traffic information. The aircraft closed to a horizontal separation of 2.3 NM at the same altitude and 0.9 NM with a 500 ft altitude difference. CSA590 crew made visual contact with D-IMUB.

Findings

  • Both aircraft were in Class C controlled airspace. CSA590 flew under IFR; D-IMUB under VFR.
  • At 17:49:01, D-IMUB first contacted FIC, 28 NM north of TMA Sector 5.
  • At 17:55:38, D-IMUB reported descending through 5500 ft QNH.
  • At 17:58:01, CAP reported to FIC, requesting information about D-IMUB and suggesting an orbit if descent was not accelerated. D-IMUB was 3.5 NM north of the TMA limit at 6700 ft descending.
  • At 17:58:20, FIC told D-IMUB to descend below 4500 ft within 2 NM to avoid TMA Sector 5, and asked if it could, otherwise to turn west. The pilot replied he would descend at 2000 ft/min and might need one more mile.
  • At 17:58:21, APE told CSA590 to stop descent at FL 60 and provided traffic information.
  • At 17:58:31, short-term conflict alert (STCA) appeared on APE's radar. Aircraft were 3.7 NM apart with 100 ft altitude difference, converging.
  • At 17:58:40, CAP instructed FIC to order D-IMUB to orbit right. D-IMUB was 1.5 NM north of TMA limit at 6100 ft descending. FIC relayed instruction.
  • At 17:59:03, D-IMUB entered TMA Sector 5 at about 5500 ft. Shortly after, separation reduced to 0.9 NM. CSA590 maintained FL 57; D-IMUB descended through 5200 ft.
  • At 17:59:17, FIC asked D-IMUB to confirm turning; pilot affirmed, but radar showed a slow right orbit beginning.
  • D-IMUB's pilot stated that the GPS-coupled Moving Map Display failed, causing loss of precise position.
  • FIC did not provide traffic information to D-IMUB about CSA590.
  • The APE noted high traffic complexity; FIC assessed traffic as medium with high coordination.
  • All controllers and the pilot held valid licences. D-IMUB pilot had about 300 flying hours, 35 on type, but had flown to Zurich frequently.

Analysis

The FIC controller assistant assumed from initial exchanges that D-IMUB's pilot was aware of TMA airspace limitations. She did not provide traffic information, prioritising the orbit instruction and monitoring its execution. Overall, the FIC's instructions and co-ordination were expedient.

The approach control dispositions were expedient. The APE's instruction to CSA590 to stop descent at FL 60 was considered the only correct decision to reduce conflict. However, in the hectic situation, the APE may have missed an incorrect readback: while the controller said “stop descent level 60”, CSA590 read back “stop six ah thousand”.

CSA590's transponder showed FL 57, possibly because the crew had switched altimeters to local QNH upon receiving the stop descent instruction, missing the flight level instruction.

D-IMUB operated as a single-pilot VFR flight in a complex twin-engine aircraft. The pilot relied on GPS with Moving Map Display, which failed about 10 NM north of the TMA limit. He should have used cross-checks with conventional visual navigation to maintain position awareness, especially in restricted airspace. His delayed and incomplete reactions to FIC instructions exacerbated the conflict, and his limited flight experience may have been insufficient for the demands of the flight and navigation conditions. Before entering TMA Sector 5, D-IMUB was in Class E airspace.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the 30 Jul 2001 BOEING B737-500 accident near TMA Zürich, CH?

Czech Airlines flight CSA590 (Boeing B735) and Cessna C414 D-IMUB came within 0.9 NM horizontally and 500 ft vertically in Zurich TMA after D-IMUB entered controlled airspace without clearance.

What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on 30 Jul 2001 involved a BOEING B737-500, registration OK-CGH, at TMA Zürich, CH.

Investigation report by the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB / SUST). Original record: https://www.sust.admin.ch/inhalte/AV-berichte/A042_e.pdf. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board (STSB), Switzerland.