What happened
On 11 May 2006, a serious air proximity incident occurred at Geneva Airport involving two Boeing 737 aircraft. The first aircraft, a B737 BBJ with registration HB-IIO operated by Privat Air, was performing a ferry flight from Kasos to Geneva. The second aircraft, a B737-700 with registration G-EZJG operated by Easyjet, was preparing for departure to London Luton.
While the HB-IIO was executing a visual approach to runway 05, the flight crew failed to implement a requested speed reduction, maintaining speeds exceeding 300 kt. Simultaneously, the Aerodrome Controller cleared the G-EZJG to line up and take off. As the HB-IIO realized it could not continue its approach and initiated a go-around, it rapidly converged on the departing aircraft. The two planes reached a minimum separation of only 0.9 NM laterally and 100 ft vertically.
The investigation
The investigation examined the flight management of both crews and the coordination between Geneva Arrival and Aerodrome Control. Investigators analyzed radar recordings and radiotelephone exchanges to reconstruct the sequence of events. The inquiry focused on the pilot's decision-making during the visual approach, the implementation of speed restrictions, and the effectiveness of the air traffic control instructions provided during the conflict.
Findings
- The HB-IIO crew failed to comply with a speed reduction request from Arrival Control, maintaining an excessive speed that led to an unstabilized approach.
- The pilot of the HB-IIO opted for a high rate of descent and a short approach, which prevented the aircraft from being configured for landing.
- ATC cleared an aircraft to take off while another was performing an unstable approach that would clearly necessitate a go-around.
- There was a lack of effective coordination between the Approach unit and Aerodrome Control.
- The Aerodrome Controller provided inaccurate traffic information, erroneously reporting the position of the departing aircraft to the arriving crew.
- The go-around procedure for runway 05, as designed, created a safety risk when simultaneous departures are required.