What happened
On January 8, 2008, an Airbus A321-211, registration F-GUAA, was performing a scheduled passenger flight from Paris Orly to Algiers. During the approach to runway 23, the pilot flying (PF), who was acting as commander from the right-hand seat, expressed discomfort regarding his lack of recent experience flying from that position.
As the aircraft approached the runway, the descent rate increased. During the flare, the pilot applied significant back pressure on the side stick. The aircraft's main gear touched the runway, but because the thrust levers were still in the CLIMB detent, the spoilers failed to deploy. This resulted in a bounce, during which the pilot finally moved the thrust levers to IDLE.
During the subsequent second touchdown, the aircraft experienced a high load factor of 3.3g. The pilot continued to maintain a high pitch attitude. Approximately 1.5 seconds after the second touchdown, the rear underside of the fuselage struck the runway, causing approximately two meters of scraping damage and structural damage to some frames.
The investigation
The BEA examined the flight data recorder, which captured the side stick inputs and aircraft performance. The investigation focused on the deployment logic of the spoilers, the crew's cockpit procedures, and the crew composition. Investigators analyzed the thrust lever positions and the sequence of events leading from the first touchdown through the bounce to the fuselage strike. The investigation also looked into the crew's communication and the impact of the pilot's lack of recent experience in the right-hand seat.
Findings
- The initial bounce was caused by a touchdown with a high descent rate while the thrust levers remained in the CLIMB position, which inhibited the automatic deployment of the spoilers.
- The pilot's lack of recent experience flying from the right-hand seat likely led to the oversight regarding the thrust lever position.
- The deployment of the spoilers during the bounce phase caused a significant increase in the load factor during the second touchdown.
- The pilot continued to apply back pressure (pitch up) after the second touchdown, leading to the fuselage strike.
- The crew failed to monitor the excessive pitch attitude or the increasing descent rate during the critical moments of the second touchdown.
- The crew composition, consisting of two experienced commanders, created a misplaced sense of confidence that hindered effective synergy and error detection.