What happened
On April 26, 2014, at approximately 10:20 UTC, a skydiver died following a jump from 4,000 m AGL at Příbram Airport (LKPM). The aircraft, carrying 16 other skydivers, had performed several jumps earlier that day. After exiting the aircraft, the skydiver experienced approximately 55 seconds of freefall before deploying a SONIC 190 main parachute at roughly 1,080 m AGL.
At an altitude of approximately 820 m AGL, the skydiver jettisoned the main parachute. Following this action, the skydiver did not manually activate the reserve parachute. Witnesses observed the skydiver in a stable belly-to-earth position, appearing to wait for the automatic activation of the reserve device. The skydist arrived at the ground at a velocity of approximately 60 m/s, sustaining fatal injuries.
The investigation
The ÚZPLN investigation examined the skydiver's equipment, including the SONIC 190 main parachute and the WP 175 reserve parachute, as well as the MPAAD automatic activation device. Investigators found that the automatic activation device had functioned, severing the closing loop at an altitude between 230 and 260 m AGL. However, the reserve parachute container flaps remained closed, and the reserve parachute only partially deployed upon impact with the ground.
Technical examination of the reserve parachute container revealed that the closing loop used was not of the length prescribed by the manufacturer. Furthermore, the investigation identified discrepancies in the maintenance records, noting that the person responsible for packing the reserve parachute had failed to properly document the packing process and had not used the required sealing wire and seal for the manual release handle.
Findings
- The skydiver failed to manually activate the reserve parachute using the deployment handle after jettisoning the main parachute.
- The skydiver may have been waiting for the automatic activation of the MPAAD device or may have mistakenly pulled the metal ring on the harness strap instead of the reserve deployment handle due to high stress.
- The reserve parachute failed to open fully because the container flaps remained closed despite the pyrotechnic cutter functioning correctly.
- This failure was likely caused by improper packing procedures, specifically the use of an incorrect closing loop length and potential errors in the installation of the pilot chute.
- The person packing the reserve parachute did not follow established procedures and failed to record the packing in the technical log.