What happened
On September 27, 2003, at 09:25 UTC, a fatal skydiving accident occurred at Kolín airfield (LKKO) during a recreational student jump. The skydiver, a 52-year-old student, exited an AN-2 aircraft at an altitude of 1,200 meters.
During the descent, a malfunction occurred in the main parachute, a MarS 330 wing. The slider became caught just below the canopy apex, preventing the parachute from fully inflating. Following instructions from the jump controller, the skydiver attempted to cut away the malfunctioning main canopy. However, this deployment occurred at an extremely low altitude, approximately 25 to 30 meters above the ground. While the cutaway triggered the deployment of the reserve parachute, the altitude was insufficient for the reserve to fully inflate. The skydiver struck a field 300 meters south of the airfield at a velocity between 36.5 and 38.5 m/s, resulting in immediate death due to polytrauma.
The investigation
The ÚZPLN investigation examined the parachute equipment, the training records of the skydiver, and the operational procedures at the airfield. The investigation included a technical expert analysis of the MarS 330 main canopy and the PZS-92 reserve parachute.
Investigators found several regulatory discrepancies regarding the equipment and flight operations. The main parachute's maintenance logs showed that required ventilation intervals had been missed on multiple occasions. Furthermore, while the logbook recorded 140 packings, expert analysis of wear suggested the parachute had actually been used for approximately 200 to 250 jumps, indicating undocumented usage. Additionally, the aircraft was found to be operating over its insured capacity; 16 jumpers were on board, exceeding the 12-passenger limit set by the insurer.
Regarding training, the investigation noted that the skydiver's training records were unreliable, as they lacked instructor signatures and did not follow a verifiable class register. The investigation also noted that the reserve parachute was not equipped with an automatic activation device (AAD).
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was a malfunction of the main parachute, specifically the slider failing to slide down the lines, which prevented the canopy from inflating.
- A contributing factor was the late cutaway of the main parachute, which left insufficient altitude for the reserve parachute to fully inflate.
- The absence of an automatic activation device (AAD) on the reserve parachute meant there was no secondary system to deploy the reserve at a safe altitude.
- Operational irregularities were noted, including exceeding aircraft passenger limits and inconsistent maintenance and usage logging for the parachute equipment.