No fatalities

Landing Gear Shimmy Damper Disconnection Leads to Torsion Link Failure on B737-300 at Paris CDG (G-CELD)

Nature du vol, FR

On July 23, 2011, a Boeing B737-300 (registration G-CELD) was involved in an aviation accident near Nature du vol, FR. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The right main landing gear shimmy damper was not connected to the aircraft hydraulic system during maintenance, preventing it from damping vibrations during landing, which led to overload and rupture of the lower torsion link. This summary draws on records from the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA).

Sourcesthe French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses (BEA)Primary reportUpdated 2026-10-18Data APIEditorial standards
Aircraft registered G-CELD
Aircraft registered G-CELD. Photo: MKY661 / CC0, via Wikimedia Commons

On 23 July 2011, a Jet2.com Boeing 737-300 experienced severe vibrations during landing roll at Paris CDG, resulting in rupture of the right main landing gear lower torsion link due to a disconnected shimmy damper hydraulic line.

Event Description

On 23 July 2011 at 08:10 UTC, a Jet2.com Boeing 737-300 (registration G-CELD) operating a scheduled passenger flight from Leeds/Bradford (UK) to Paris Charles de Gaulle (France) landed on runway 27R. Upon touchdown at a groundspeed of 129 kt, the crew reported violent vibrations, particularly in the rudder pedals. During the landing roll, lateral acceleration oscillated with increasing amplitude, reaching 0.8 g at 90 kt (peak absolute lateral acceleration of 0.41 g) and decreasing to 0.4 g at 80 kt. The aircraft veered slightly right of the runway centerline. Oscillations ceased abruptly at 75 kt; the lateral deviation peaked at about 10 m right before the aircraft returned to the centerline. The aircraft vacated the runway via taxiway Z3 and stopped, later towed to the gate. Inspection revealed significant damage to the right main landing gear, specifically to the lower torsion link.

Maintenance Findings

The preceding day (22 July 2011), the aircraft underwent maintenance that included complete replacement of both main landing gears at Jet2.com's Leeds/Bradford facility. After installation of the new right main landing gear, the hydraulic line for the shimmy damper was not reconnected to the aircraft hydraulic system. A metal plug was installed on the port of the supply tee, maintaining system pressure but leaving the damper disconnected. Post-maintenance tests—retracting and extending the landing gear about ten times while the aircraft was on jacks—did not stress the shimmy damper and therefore did not detect the omission.

Workload and Procedural Issues

The maintenance work card (Boeing task card 32-011-00-02) for right main landing gear installation included subtask 32-11-00-034-169 covering reconnection of hydraulic lines, but it did not specifically mention the shimmy damper line. At Jet2.com, this subtask was not classified as requiring independent inspection; only one supervisor signed off. On 22 July 2011, the maintenance team was scheduled to handle two aircraft (G-CELD and another for planned inspections), but an unscheduled third aircraft arrived for fuselage repair, overwhelming the personnel. The supervisor working on G-CELD interrupted to assist with the other aircraft, and mechanics were reassigned without proper coordination. The supervisor had accumulated excessive working hours, leading to fatigue. Under time pressure, the reconnection of the shimmy damper line was omitted, despite signatures from the mechanic and supervisor on the work card.

Corrective Actions

Following its internal investigation, Jet2.com implemented several measures from September 2011:

  • A new procedure for control of plugs on hydraulic, pneumatic, and gas systems, requiring visible identification tags and a log to track placement and removal.
  • Addition of specific items on landing gear change work cards to verify shimmy damper hydraulic connection and require independent inspection by a second supervisor.
  • A new shift system (4 work days, 4 rest days) limiting work to 48 hours per 7-day period (extendable to 60 for unforeseen constraints).
  • Revised maintenance planning to avoid overloading resources.
  • Integration of lessons learned into maintenance personnel training.

Boeing published temporary revisions (TR 32-1015 and TR 32-1016) in November 2011 to the B737-300/400/500 AMM, explicitly requiring reconnection and bleeding of the shimmy damper hydraulic line during landing gear installation.

Probable cause

The right main landing gear shimmy damper was not connected to the aircraft hydraulic system during maintenance, preventing it from damping vibrations during landing, which led to overload and rupture of the lower torsion link.

Frequently asked questions

What happened in the 23 Jul 2011 Boeing B737-300 accident near Nature du vol, FR?

On 23 July 2011, a Jet2.com Boeing 737-300 experienced severe vibrations during landing roll at Paris CDG, resulting in rupture of the right main landing gear lower torsion link due to a disconnected shimmy damper hydraulic line.

Were there any fatalities in the 23 Jul 2011 Boeing B737-300 accident?

No fatalities were recorded in this accident.

What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on 23 Jul 2011 involved a Boeing B737-300, registration G-CELD, at Nature du vol, FR.

What was the probable cause of the accident?

The right main landing gear shimmy damper was not connected to the aircraft hydraulic system during maintenance, preventing it from damping vibrations during landing, which led to overload and rupture of the lower torsion link.