Incident Overview
On February 7, 2017, a Boeing B738 aircraft operated by Ryanair (RYR) experienced an incident at EPMO airport. During the takeoff rotation phase, the flight crew felt and heard a strike. The crew correctly diagnosed a tail strike and executed the appropriate emergency checklist from the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH). Following a holding pattern of approximately 90 minutes to burn off fuel and reduce landing mass, the aircraft returned to EPMO and landed safely. All 170 passengers and crew members evacuated without injury.
Operational Context and De-icing
The investigation noted that while snow was not actively falling or was minimal on the ground, the runway surface was reported as contaminated with wet snow less than 1 mm deep. The crew did not use the TALPA matrix for takeoff performance calculations, citing that the runway was being cleaned. They relied on performance data calculated using OPT based on tower reports of braking conditions rated as medium-good.
The crew requested de-icing due to ice observed on the lower wing surfaces. A two-step de-icing process was performed: Type 1 fluid (30% concentration) followed by Type 2 fluid (100%). The De-icing/Anti-icing Report (DAR) confirmed that all critical surfaces, including wings, stabilizers, and rudder, were treated. However, the holdover time was not recorded on the DAR. Additionally, the crew did not complete the control surface check portion of the low-temperature checklist, though neither pilot recalled this omission.
Takeoff Dynamics and Analysis
During rotation, the captain reported that the nose gear felt "stuck" to the runway before suddenly lifting off, causing a rapid pitch-up described as "pulling a cork from a bottle." Flight data recorder (FDR) data indicated a pitch angle of 12.74° at the moment of the strike. The automatic slots deployed one second after rotation at a pitch angle of 13.71° and an airspeed of 162 kts.
Boeing's analysis suggested that a combination of factors contributed to the tail skid contacting the runway, including speed stagnation during rotation, spoiler movement reducing lift, and reduced engine thrust. While computer simulations could not fully replicate the event by adjusting center of gravity alone, suggesting potential unmodeled atmospheric disturbances or contamination effects, no definitive evidence of significant ice or snow contamination on the wings was found to be a contributing factor. The control systems and automatic slots functioned as expected without anomalies.
Conclusion
The investigation concluded that no direct cause for the tail strike could be definitively established. No safety recommendations were issued by the commission, and the operator did not formulate preventive actions.