Incident Overview
On 24 February 2017, a Boeing 737-800 operated by Enter Air Sp. z o.o. was conducting a scheduled passenger flight from Dublin Airport (EIDW) to Lanzarote Airport (GCRR). During the flight, the crew unknowingly entered the North Atlantic High Level Airspace (NAT HLA) within the Shanwick Flight Information Region (FIR EGGX) while navigating on airway T9 between waypoints LASNO and BEGAS. The operator did not hold authorization for operations in FIR Shanwick, and the flight crew had not received the required training for NAT HLA operations.
Sequence of Events
The flight plan prepared by the operator's dispatch department routed the aircraft through FIR EGGX. The dispatcher did not receive any warning or on-screen alert regarding the flight's path through Shanwick Oceanic airspace. Although a warning had been introduced into the flight planning system on 9 December 2016 by the operator's operations department, this modification proved ineffective because such changes can only be made by the system administrator.
After reaching cruising level, Shannon ATC instructed the crew to establish radio contact with Shanwick ATS on the second radio set to obtain an oceanic clearance. The crew responded that they were unable to comply, stating "negative, unable to comply." Shannon ATC reiterated the instruction. During the subsequent flight, the crew did not receive any information suggesting they were entering NAT HLA. Eventually, after establishing contact with Shanwick ATS on the second set, the crew was asked to provide estimated times of arrival, altitudes, and speeds at LASNO and BEGAS. Before reaching LASNO, Shannon ATC again instructed the crew to contact Shanwick ATS. Approximately 15 minutes into the flight, the crew was directed to establish communication on HF frequencies 3491/5649, where they were instructed to contact Madrid ATC after passing BEGAS.
The crew then checked their position on IFR charts and suspected they were within NAT HLA, approximately 60 nautical miles from the exit point. They decided to continue to BEGAS to leave the airspace as quickly as possible. The total transit time on airway T9 between LASNO and BEGAS was 27 minutes.
Investigation Findings
The investigation determined the following:
- The route planned by the operational department passed through FIR EGGX.
- The dispatcher preparing the flight plan did not receive a warning or on-screen alert regarding the route's passage through Shanwick Oceanic FIR.
- The documentation provided to the crew by the operational department contained elements that could have enabled identification of the entry into NAT HLA.
- The flight crew lacked appropriate training for operations in the NAT HLA area.
Probable Cause
The cause of the incident was incorrect operational planning by the operator's operational department.
Preventive Actions
Following the incident, the operator took several preventive measures:
- The crew reported the probable transit of NAT HLA to the operational department after landing.
- On 28 February 2017, the ability to plan flights through FIR EGGX was disabled in the flight planning system.
- The operator notified the manager of the flight planning software program to clarify the instructions so that information regarding modifications that can only be made by the system administrator is explicitly included.
- The operator analyzed the potential training of flight personnel to obtain NAT HLA endorsements and expand the operational specification to include flights in FIR EGGX.
Safety Recommendations
No safety recommendations were issued by the investigation commission.