What happened
On the evening of May 5, 2012, at approximately 22:22 UTC, a collision occurred between two large aircraft at Abu Dhabi International Airport. An Airbus A330-243, registration A6-EYN, was being pushed back from parking stand 122 for a scheduled flight to Brussels. During the maneuver, the right-hand winglet of the A3 .330 made contact with the left wingtip of a stationary Boeing 777-300, registration A6-ETD, which was parked at the adjacent stand 121.
The collision resulted in structural damage to both aircraft. The A6-EYN required the removal of its right-hand winglet under the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) to allow for departure. The A6-ETD sustained significant damage to its secondary structure, rendering the aircraft Aircraft On Ground (AOG) pending major repairs.
The investigation
The GCAA AAIS investigation examined the ground handling procedures, cockpit visibility, and aerodrome infrastructure. Investigators analyzed the pushback path, noting that the aircraft was being positioned on a radial approximately 20 degrees off the nominal pushback line. The investigation also reviewed the roles of the ground crew, specifically the headset man and the tractor driver, and evaluated the visibility conditions during the twilight operation.
Findings
Several critical factors contributed to the contact between the two aircraft:
- Non-standard pushback procedures: The driver utilized a maneuver designed to avoid engine jet blast interference with the nearby perimeter road, which involved turning the aircraft early.
- Lack of wing walkers: No additional personnel were utilized to monitor wingtip clearance during the maneuver.
- Inadequate visibility: Poor surface definition and a lack of clear lead-in lighting or reflectors made it difficult for the driver to navigate the markings.
- Personnel positioning: The headset man was seated within the pushback tug facing the opposite direction of travel, rather than walking alongside the aircraft.
- Organizational gaps: There was a lack of standardized communication and a lack of clearly defined leadership or hierarchy between the tug driver and the headset man.
Safety action
The investigation led to several safety recommendations aimed at standardizing ground operations. These include requirements for the ground handling entity and the airline to develop standardized operating procedures (SOPs) for pushback, including mandatory pre-pushback briefings and clearly defined team roles. Additionally, recommendations were made to improve aerodrome infrastructure, such as installing lead-in lights and implementing a Tug Release Point (TRP) procedure to ensure safe engine starts near perimeter roads.