What happened
The incident occurred while the aircraft was approximately 15 miles southwest of the airport, being vectored for a Category II approach to Runway 36. During this phase, the local controller authorized the ground controller to clear snow removal equipment to proceed north on Runway 36 and exit at the intersection with Runway 27L.
The aircraft reported reaching the outer marker and was subsequently cleared to land. Crucially, there was no communication between the local and ground controllers regarding the status or location of the snow removal equipment. Just after touchdown, the captain observed the amber rotating beacon of one of the vehicles approximately 1,000 feet ahead. The captain executed an immediate go-around, and the aircraft missed the eight vehicles by an estimated 10 feet. The runway visual range was reported as 3,000 feet.
The investigation
The primary finding centered on the breakdown in communication between air traffic control sectors. The local controller cleared the aircraft for landing without confirming that the runway was clear of snow removal operations authorized by the ground controller. This lack of coordination created a hazardous situation where active ground vehicles were present on an active runway while an aircraft was on final approach.
Findings
The critical factor was the failure to communicate between the local and ground controllers regarding the presence of snow removal equipment on the runway. The absence of this information led to the aircraft being cleared for landing onto a runway that was not fully clear of ground vehicles. The close proximity to the vehicles, estimated at only 10 feet, highlights the severity of this procedural lapse.