Were there any fatalities in the 13 Jul 1988 1988 British International Helicopters Sikorsky S-61N crash accident?

No fatalities were recorded in this accident.

What aircraft was involved and where did it happen?

The accident on 13 Jul 1988 involved a 1988 British International Helicopters Sikorsky S-61N crash.

Controlled Ditching of Sikorsky S-61N G-BEID After Engine Fire in 1988

On July 13, 1988, a 1988 British International Helicopters Sikorsky S-61N crash was involved in an aviation accident. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The fire occurred in the helicopter's main gearbox, probably resulting from the effects of a bearing failure in the No. 2 engine. A further factor was the lack of fire detection or suppression capability within the gearbox bay. This summary draws on records from Wikidata contributors; 1 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

On 13 July 1988, a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter made a controlled ditching northeast of Sumburgh following an engine fire. All 21 occupants evacuated safely. Investigation found fire originated in main gearbox due to bearing failure.

Accident Overview

On 13 July 1988, a Sikorsky S-61N helicopter, registration G-BEID, operated by British International Helicopters, executed a controlled ditching in the sea approximately 29 nautical miles (54 km) northeast of Sumburgh. The ditching followed an engine fire that occurred during a flight from the Safe Felicia semi-submersible oil platform in the Forties oilfield. There were no fatalities among the two pilots and 19 passengers on board.

Flight and Incident

The helicopter departed the Safe Felicia platform at 13:45 for a scheduled one-hour flight to Sumburgh Airport on the Shetland Mainland. At 14:28, the co-pilot, who was flying the aircraft, reported hearing a muffled bang from the area of the No. 2 engine transmission. Some passengers also heard the noise. Shortly thereafter, the No. 2 engine's fire warning lights activated. The pilot immediately initiated a descent and transmitted a distress call.

Approximately 48 seconds after the noise, the No. 2 engine was shut down and its fire extinguisher was triggered. Subsequently, the No. 1 engine fire warning also illuminated. Passengers observed oil leaking from the cabin ceiling. The pilot advised passengers to prepare for an emergency ditching and took control of the helicopter. Floats were deployed, and a gentle ditching was made about three minutes after the initial noise. By that time, the cabin had filled with smoke.

Evacuation and Wreckage

All 21 occupants evacuated onto liferafts and were subsequently winched into a Search and Rescue helicopter. After evacuation, a strong fire consumed most of the floating helicopter, which then broke up and sank.

Investigation

A recovery operation commenced using the diving support vessel (DSV) Stena Marianos, which arrived on site on 16 July 1988. The aft fuselage section was raised the following day, and the forward section shortly after. Recovery had to be paused on 19 July due to the vessel's other commitments. The operation resumed on 2 August using the DSV Norskald, and the engines, main rotor, and transmission were located and raised on 5 August.

Cause

The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) concluded that the fire had occurred in the helicopter's main gearbox, probably resulting from the effects of a bearing failure in the No. 2 engine. A further factor was the lack of fire detection or suppression capability within the gearbox bay. The cause of the bearing failure could not be definitely established.

Safety Recommendations

The AAIB issued 27 safety recommendations to the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), addressing improvements in maintenance, early detection of problems, emergency escape equipment, documentation and training provisions, and firewall integrity. Most of these recommendations were accepted by the CAA.

Probable cause

The fire occurred in the helicopter's main gearbox, probably resulting from the effects of a bearing failure in the No. 2 engine. A further factor was the lack of fire detection or suppression capability within the gearbox bay. The cause of the bearing failure could not be definitely established.