Casualties unknown

Uncontained Engine Failure During Initial Climb After Takeoff (N875RA)

Las Vegas, NV, US

On June 18, 1997, a Mcdonnell Douglas MD-83 (registration N875RA) was involved in an aviation accident near Las Vegas, NV. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: the maintenance/overhaul facility's improper repair, which led to obstructed oil supply hole(s) at the #5 bearing inner race, then oil starvation and subsequent uncontained engine failure. This summary draws on records from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive.

Sourcesthe U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archivePrimary reportUpdated 2026-06-10Data APIEditorial standards

An aircraft experienced an uncontained left engine failure during initial climb after takeoff. The flight returned and landed uneventfully. Investigation found plugged oil supply holes on the No. 5 bearing retaining nut due to improper grit blasting during recent repairs.

Incident Overview

An aircraft suffered an uncontained left engine failure during the initial climb after takeoff. The flight crew returned to the departure airport and executed an uneventful landing. The engine was subsequently removed and sent to the repair facility that had performed major repairs on it 76.9 flight hours prior.

Teardown Examination

During the teardown examination of the engine, investigators found that the No. 5 bearing inner race retaining nut had its oil supply holes plugged. This condition was attributed to the maintenance procedures applied during the most recent repair.

Maintenance Procedure Deviation

According to the Pratt and Whitney Standard Practices Manual, the process for plating silver over steel requires that the No. 5 bearing race be grit blasted to remove old plating. The specified method, Service Process Operations Procedure (SPOP) 10, calls for the use of PMC 3052-9 aluminum oxide grit. The SPOP consumable materials list identifies PMC 3052-9 as 500 aluminum oxide grit.

However, during the actual processing of the nut, maintenance personnel used 120 grit aluminum oxide for grit blasting. This was contrary to the Pratt and Whitney recommendation, which specifies using 200 to 500 grit aluminum oxide media or glass beads. Additionally, the procedure required that the nut be cleaned and flushed after grit blasting to remove any residual debris.

The use of coarser grit than recommended likely resulted in debris that plugged the oil supply holes, leading to the engine failure.

Investigation report by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) historical archive. Original record: https://carol.ntsb.gov/event/20001208X08165. This page is a structured re-presentation; facts and quotes are in the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), United States.